LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE CONTRACTS.

nent domain is unwarranted and void ; and that provision of the
Constitution of the United States which forbids the state violating
the obligation of contracts could not be so construed as to render
valid and effectual such a bargain, which originally was inexcess
of proper authority. See also Id. 343; Rd. v. Rd., 97 Ill. .506;
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 531. There are cases
where the state might bind itself, and where it would be powerless
under the provisions of the constitution cited to pass future laws
releasing itself from assumed obligations, but this is not one of
them. The state had no power to divest itself of the right of eminent domain by any act it might pass which would prevent the
exercise of that right in the future, when in the opinion of the legislature a case arose wherein the public interest demanded the exercise
of the power."
In conclusion it seems:
1. That a state may remit taxes by a valid contract.
2. That it may grant monopolies, provided they do not relate to
business which every one may engage in.
3. That it cannot make a contract which impairs the police
power.
4. That the state cannot bargain away the exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
5. That there are certain limitations on legislative power, (1) the
Constitution of the United States, (2) of a state, (3) sometimes, the
common law.
JAMES P. ROOT.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
MITCHELL, J.-Prior to the 15th day of July 1884, Fletcher &
Sharpe were engaged as partners in conducting a general banking
business in the city of Indianapolis. Having conducted the bank
to insolvency, they procured the Marion Superior Court to take
the administration of its affairs, by mutually consenting that one of
the judges of that court should appoint a receiver, and take possession of its assets. Through its receiver the court continues in the
administration of the insolvent concern.
On the 29th day of September 1884, while the affairs of the bank
were thus in the custody of the court, Mahlan H. Floyd and Jay
G. Voss, administrators of the estate of Gustavus H. Voss, in an
intervening petition to the court, alleged that soon after their appointment they had, as such administrators, deposited in the Fletcher
& Sharpe bank about $40,000 of the funds of the estate for safekeeping. They alleged that, at the time of receiving such fund,
Fletcher & Sharpe had full notice that it belonged to the estate, and
that the same was placed in their custody by the petitioners in their
trust capacity, and they aver that the fund was so received by
Fletcher & Sharpe. The petition alleges the subsequent insolvency of the bank, and the appointment of William Wallace as
receiver, and that, as such receiver, he has the possession of its
assets. It is shown that about $22,000 of the money so deposited
remained in the bank at the time of its suspension. The petitioners
aver that the receiver has in his possession a large amount of assets,
consisting of bills receivable and choses in action, in which Fletcher
& Sharpe had wrongfuily invested the moneys so deposited by the
petitioners. They ask that the court shall order the receiver to pay
over to them the full sum of money so deposited, and yet remaining
unpaid by the bank at the date of its suspension. An issue was
made by a denial on behalf of the receiver, and upon a hearing the
prayer of the petition was denied, and judgment rendered that the
petitioners take nothing.
The question arises upon the evidence. There was no disagreement as to the material facts in the case. The funds were deposited in the bank, from time to time, to the credit of the petitioners.
It may be assumed that the account was opened and continued on
the books of the bank in the name of the petitioners, as administrators of the estate of Voss, although this does not very distinctly
appear. It does appear, however, that Fletcher & Sharpe were
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notified, when the first deposit was made, that the funds thus deposited, and such as should thereafter be deposited by the petitioners, were and would be the funds of the estate, and a trust
fund, and that no checks would be drawn upon it, except for the
purpose of the estate, and that all checks would be signed by the
petitioners as administrators. An ordinary bank-account of debt
and credit was kept; the petitioners having the customary passbook evidencing the amount of their deposits from time to time.
When the bank suspended, the amount due the petitioners on their
account was $22,042.52. There was a sufficient sum of money
went into the hands of the receiver, when be took possession, to
have paid the amount due the petitioners. The total amount of
assets was about $500,000; the liabilities aggregated $1,500,000.
Upon this state of facts it is now argued that the petitioners
were entitled to an order giving them a preference over other general depositors. Whether the loss to the fund occasioned by the
suspension and insolvency of the bank will ultimately fall upon the
petitioners, is a question in no way directly involved in the decision
of this case. The principles which determine the liability of trustees who become depositors of trust funds were considered, to some
extent, in the case of Naltner v. Dolan, 8 N. E. Rep. 289, and
cases cited. Nor does the case involve any question as to the right
of the bank to appropriate the fund for an indebtedness due from
the depositors, as in Bundy v. Town of .lfontiello,84 Ind. 119.
There are many cases in which the question has arisen as to the
equitable rights of cestuis que trust to purpose a trust fund which
has been misapplied or diverted by the trustee, or which the creditors of the latter are seeking to subject or appropriate to the payment of debts due them. The general doctrine is well established
that equity will follow a fund through any number of transmutations,
and preserve and protect it for the real beneficiary so long as such
fund can be identified and followed: Nat. Bank v. 1i. Co., 104
U. S. 54; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 DeG., M. & G_ 372; Prith v.
Qartland, 2 Hem. & M. 417; K'nathbull v. .allett, 13 Ch. Div.
696; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562; -Farmers'Bank
v. King, 57 Penn. St. 202; Van Alen v. American Bank, 52
N. Y. 1 ; Naitner v. Dolan, supra.
The class of cases above cited are relied upon by the appellant
for a reversal of the ruling below. The distinction between the
cases relied on and the case being considered is obvious. Those
Von. XXXV.-1O
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were cases in which the aid of a court of equity was invoked by the
rightful owners to preserve a trust fund from misappropriation by a
trustee of his creditors. This is a case in which trustees, with
others, have become general depositors in a bank which has become
insolvent, and whose assets are now in the hands of a receiver for
distribution among all its creditors according to law. The question
is, do persons who become general depositors of trust funds in such
manner as to create the relation of debtor and creditor between
themselves and the bank in which the funds are deposited, stand upon
a different level from other general depositors ?
There is no question but what the funds were properly deposited.
The propriety of the conduct of the trustees in making the deposit,
or of the bank in receiving it, is not in dispute, nor does the evidence suggest any wrongful misappropriation or diversion of the
fund either by the bank or the trustees. When deposits are received,
unless they are special deposits, they belong to the bank as a part
of its general funds, and the relation of debtor and creditor arises
between the bank and the depositor. This is equally so whether the
deposit is of trust money or funds which are impressed with no
trust, provided the act of depositing is no misappropriation of the
fund. If, in receiving a trust fund, a bank acted with knowledge
that it was taking the fund in violation of the duty of the trustee,
the rights of the cestui que trust might be different. In respect to
such a case we decide nothing here. In this case, where no impropriety is imputed to the bank in receiving the money, it becomes
the debtor of the petitioners, and its debt to them was of the same
character as its debt to any other depositor, and must be paid in
the same proportion. The rights of other creditors stand on a level
with those of the petitioners, and are to be guarded and protected
by the court with the same vigilance: McLain v. Wallace, 103 Ind.
563; s. c. 5 N. E. Rep. 911; Nat. Bank v. -llicott, 31 Kan. 173;
S. c.1 Pac. Rep. 593 ; Etna Nat. Bank v. FourthNat. Bank, 46
N. Y. 82; Att'y-Gen. v. Is. Co., 71 N. Y. 325 ; Bank of Republic
v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152.
There was no error. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
When a depositor places money in a
bank, what is the relation between the
depositor and the bank? This question
lias been answered by a number of courts
by stating that it is simply that of debtor

and creditor. Thus Mr. Justice DAVIS,
in the case of the Bank of Republic v.
Millard, 10 Wall. 152, said: "It is no
longer an open question in rhis court
since the decision in the cases of the Me-
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rine Batk v. The Fulton Bank, 2 Wall.
252; and of Tiompson v. Riqgs, supra,
that the relation of bank and customer
in their pecuniary dealings is that of
debtor and creditor. It is an important
part of the business of a bank to receive
deposits, but when they are received, unless there are stipulations to the contrary,
they belong to the bank, and become part
of its general fund, and can be loaned
by it as their money. The banker is
accountable for the deposits which he rereives as a debtor, and he agrees to discharge its debts by honoring the checks
which the depositors shall from time to
time draw on him. The contract between the parties is purely a legal one
and has nothing of the nature of a trust
in it."
"Tie right of a depositor, as was said
by an eminent judge, is a chose in action, and it does not further the debt and
give a lien upon it to a third person without tle assent of the depositor. This is a
well-established principle of law and is
sustained by the English and American
authorities."
In New York, it was said: "The relation of banker and depositor is that of
creditor and debtor. Deposits on general account belong to the bank as part
of its general fund. The bank becomes
a debtor to the depositor to the amount
thereof, and the debt can only be discharged by payment to the depositor or
pursuant to his order. Until payment
or acceptance by the bank of a depositor's
check, or assignment of the credit by the
depositor and notice to the bank, the deposit is subject to his order :" Lunt v.
Bank of North America, 49 Barb. 221.
So in Massachusetts,. in the case of
Carrv. Nat. Security Bank, 107 Mass.
45, Justice GRnY, who delivered the
opinion, speaking of general deposits,
observed that " Money deposited becomes the absolute property of the bankers, impressed with no trust, and which
they may dispose of at their pleasure,
subject only to their personal obligation

to pay an equivalent sum upon his demand or order. The right of the bankers
to use the money for their own benefit, is
the very consideration for their promise
to the depositor. They make no agreement with the holder of his checks. A
check drawn by the depositor in common
form, not designating any special fund out
of which it is to be paid, not corresponding to the whole amount due him
from the bankers at the time, is a mere
contract between the drawer and the
payee, on which, if payable to bearer and
not paid by the drawees, the holder
might doubtless sue the drawer, but which
passes no title, legal or equitable, to the
payee or holder in the moneys previously
paid to the bankers by the drawer."
This is the language of all the cases,
upon this subject with respect to the relation of a general depositor and the
bank: Thompson v. R iqgs, 5 Wall. 663;
The Frst Nat. Bank of Washington v.
Whitman, 4 Otto 343; Dickinson v.
Coates, 23 Am. L. Reg. 181 ; ilMerchants'
Nat. Bank v. Coats, Id. 188, and note.
Thus in Foley v. iftill, 2 H. L. 28, it
was held that the relation of banker and
creditor who pay money into the bank is
the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor, with a superadded obligation arising
out of the custom of bankers to honor
the customer's drafts ; and that relation
is not altered by an agreement by the
banker to allow the customer interest on
the balance in the bank. See MeEwen
V. Davis, 39 Ind. 109 ; The State v.
Clark, 4 Id. 315 ; Coqiln v. Anderson, 4
Blackf. 395; In 3l1atter of Franklin
Bank, 1 Paige 249 ; s. c. 9 Am. Dec.
413; Corbit v. Bank, 34 Barb. 298 ;
Corbit v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Harr. 235;
Marsh v. Oneida Cent. Bank, 34 Barb.
298; Lund v. Seamen's Bank, 37 Id.
129 : Allen v. FourthNat. Bank, 5 Jones
& Sp. 137; s. a. 59 N. Y. 12; Chapman v. J1rhite, 6 Id. 412; .3tina Nat.
Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 Id. 82;
s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 314 ; Bank of Northern Liberties v. Jones, 41 Penn. St. 536;
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Caffln v. Anderson, 4 Blackf. 395 ; Wray
v. Ins. Co., 34 Ala. 58; Boy1 den v. Bank
of Cape Fear, 65 N. C. 13; Robinson v.
Gardiner, 18 Gratt. 509 ; Knecht v. U.S.
avings Inst., 2 Mo. App. 563; Garnett
v. MoKewan, L. R., 8 Exch. 10; s. o.
4 Moak's Eng. 419 ; Foley v. Hill, 2 H.
L. Cas. 28; Sims v. Bond, 2 Nev. &
M. 608; s. c. 6 B. & Ald. 392; Carr
v. Carr, 1 Mer. 541 ; Goodwin v. Ro,barts, L. R., 10 Exch. 351 ; Watts v.
Christie, 11 Beav. 546; Deraynes v.
Noble, 1 Mer. 569 ; Pott v. Clegg, 16
Mees. & W. 321 : Planters' Bank v.
Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483; Nat. Bank
v. Conn. lut. Life Ins. Co., 14 Otto 54.
If money, checks or bills be deposited
generally, and are lost, destroyed, stolen
or become worthless, the bank sustains
the loss : Matter of Franklin Bank, 1
Paige 249.
When a general deposit is made, the
transaction may be effected by a number
of extraneous circumstances; for instance,
the depositor may be a mere trustee,
holding the money in a fiduciary capacity,
or at the time the bank receives the money
it may be wholly insolvent. In the latter case its insolvency may not be known
to the bank or to its officers at the time
the money is received, or the bank may
receive the money believing that it may
be able to pay it back when demanded :
or it may receive it knowing at the time
of its reception that it will not be able
to refund it in whole when demanded by
depositor. If the money is paid in by a
trustee, the bank may or may not
know of the capacity in which he holds
it. All these are material questions to
be inquired into when it is endeavored
to follow it as a trust fund, to compel its
refunding as such a fund.
And it should also be noticed here that
there is a difference between money held
by a trustee which he has rightfully deposited in a bank, and the money which he
has acquired by a violation of his trust ;
as where he has converted trust property
into .money, and deposited it in the bank.

In the first instance, where a trustee is
a general depositor, he is to be treated as
any other general depositor putting his
own money into the bank, but where ie
has violated his trust, the money is impressed with the fiduciary capacity in
which he held it, and it can be traced and
reclaimed in whosesoever's hands it may
come with notice of its character.
First. As an illustration of what has
been previously said, we cite the case of
31cLain v. Wallace, 103 Ind. 562. McLain was clerk of the Circuit Court, and
had on deposit in a bank, in the name
of "Moses G. MeLain, clerk," a large
sum of money, subject to his order as
such clerk.
The bank failed, and he
sought to recover back the full amount
upon the ground that he held it as a
trustee,-the money being certain sums
which had come into his hands by virtue
of his holding the position of clerk. This
was refused by the court, and in rendering an opinion it said: "The question Is
what are the rights of a bank-deposhor,
when the bank becomes insolvent? Deposits in bank are either general or special. Upon a special deposit the bank
is merely a bailee. and is bound according to the terms of the special deposit;
but on a general deposit, without special
agreement, the money becomes the property of the bank, and the depositor
has no longer any claim on the money:
his claim is on the bank for a like
amount of money. Upon the insolvency of a bank, its general depositors
must be paid pra rata. The rule that
a trustee may follow trust property as
long as it can be traced, is not applicable
to such a case. The addition of the
work "clerk" to the name of a general
depositor, does not make the deposit a
special one, nor does it change the liability of the bank."
In the case of the St. Louis, 6-c., Rd.
Co. v. Johnston, Receiver, 27 Fed. Rep.
243, the facts were as follows : A., who
had for several years kept an account
with the Marine National Bank of New

FLETCHER v. SHARPE.
York, deposited on the fifth day of May,
1884, a sight draft dated that day, and
drawn by him on a corporation of Boston, which was indebted to him in the
amount of the draft. The bank was insolvent at the time. It forwarded and
collected the draft May the seventh, but
not until the bank had closed its doors.
The draft was deposited and credited to
the depositor as a cash item. It was
held by Judge WALLACE, that the draft
was not the property of A. when paid by
the payee, and that he was not entitled to
recover the amount thereof from the
receiver. It was also further held that
when such a trust is credited by the
banker to a customer as a cash item, with
the latter's assent, the transaction is
equivalent to the discount of the bill of
the bank. In the case of the Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd, 90 I. Y.
530, the court says, "By the acceptance
of a check by a bank receiving it as so
much money, it becomes debtor to the
customer to the extent of the amount
credited in account on account of it, and
while he did not draw checks or drafts
against it, but the bank was largely his
debtor, he still had a right to do it if he
had been so disposed. The account, including the amount of check, stood with
his assent as so much money subject to
his disposal, and because of that circumstance, he ceased to be the owner of the
check, and the title of it became vested
in the bank as its own property, subject
to its risk in case of loss."
In Titus v. Merchants' Bank, 6
Vroom 588, checks and cash were deposited, and all were credited as cash.
The cheeks ,1 were received and credited
in the cash account as cash in part payment of an over-draft, and in part to be
drawn against. They were received and
credited in the same way as bills ornotes
of other banks. By such crediting, the
bank became the owner of such bills, as
they do the legal owner of bank bills so
deposited, and had the defendants failed
the next day, the plaintiff could not have

recovered these identical checks as their
property left for collection, against the
receiver or the assignee in bankruptcy."
Touching on this point, we cite The
People v. Merchants' and Mechanics'
Bank of Tro, 78 N. Y. 269 ; In re Le
Blanc, 14 Hun 8 ; Metropolitan Bank
v. Loyd, 25 Id. 101 ; Ellicottv. Barnes,
31"Kan. 170 : s. c. First Fae. Rep.
767; McComas v. Long, 85 Ind. 549 ;
In the nmatter of WVest of England and
South Wales District Bank, L. R., 11
Ch. Div. 772.
But it may happen that the money is
deposited merely by an agent. Thus a
banker's lien ordinarily attaches in favor
of the bank, upon the securities and
moneys of the customer, deposited in
the usual course of business, for advances
which are supposed to be made upon
their credit, not only against the depos.
itor, but against the unknown equities
of all others in interest; bnt this cannot
be permitted to prevail against the equity
of the beneficial owner, of which the
bank has notice either actual or constructive.
Thus when a bank account is
opened in the name of the depositor as
the general agent, and it is known to the
bank that he is the agent of an insurance
company : that conducting its agency is
his chief business; that the account was
opened to facilitate that business, and
used as a means of accumulating the
premiums of policies collected by him
for it, and by making payments to it by
checks ; the bank is chargeable with
notice of the equitable rights of the company, although the depositor deposited
his moneys in the same account and drew
checks upon it for his private use. And
the insurance company may enforce, by
bill in equity, its beneficial ownership
therein against the bank, claiming a lien
upon the balance thereof for a debt due
to it from the depositor, contracted for
his individual use: Central National
Bank of Baltimore v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 14 Otto 54.
So in the case of Bailel v. inch, L.
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R., 7 Q. B. 34, the plaintiff, as trustee
of a bankrupt banking firm, sought to
recover a bahance of the banking account
which had been overdrawn. The defendant sought to set off a balance due to him
as executor of A.. in which name he
had another account, and proved that as
residuary legatee, he was beneficially
entitled to this balance, the legatees'being otherwise satisfied. It was held that
the effect of the account being in the
name of the executor was to affect the
bank with notice if there were any equities attaching to the fund ; but that under the circumstances there were no such
equities as to prevent the defendant from
treating the balance as a fund to which
he was beneficially, as well as legally, entitled, and that, consequently, he was
entitled to set it against the plaintiff's
claim. Chief Justice CocinuaN said :
"There can be no doubt that in point
of law, the estate and effects of the deceased tpstatrix pass to the defendant as
executor. And, although it may be for
his convenience to open an account in his
own name as executor, instead of his own
name as private customer, the whole effect
of that is, I apprehend, to affect the bank
with the knowledge of the character in
which he holds the money. Therefore,
if there were persons beneficially interested in that fund, the bank might be
liable to be restrained by proceedings in
equity from dealing with the fund as if it
were one in which their customer, the defendant, was beneficially interested, absolutely without reference to any trust
or beneficial interest to which it was subject." In the same case, BLAcBuRN, J.,
said, that opening the account as executor
operated "as a notice to them as a statem~nt to a bank: I This account which I
am opening is not my own limited property, but it is money which belongs to
the estate which I am administering as
executor; consequently, there may be
persons who have equitable claims upon
it.' The bank would have been bound
by an equity which did exist, of

which they had notice at the time the
bank became bankrupt."
In the case of Pannell v. Hurley, 2
Coll. Ch. C. 241, the depositor having
two accounts, one in trust the other in
his own name, drew his check as trustee
to pay his private debt to the banker.
The vice-chancellor put the case as follows: "Money is due from A. to B., in
trust for C. B. is indebted to A. on
his own account. A. with the knowledge
of the trust concurs with B. in setting
one debt against the other, which is done
without C.'s consent. Can it be a question in equity whether such a transaction
can stand ?"

In Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382,
certain certificates of stuck were endorsed,
" E. Carter, trustee," and were thus
transferred to the holder for value and
without actual notice that they were held
by Carter as trustee. The question arose
whether the word " trustee" imparted
notice to the holder; and the court held
that it did, saying that "unless the word
trustee may be regarded as mere descriptio personce and rejected as a nullity,
there was plain and actual notice of the
etistence of the trust, and of some description. * * * And that the mere use

of the word ' trustee' in the assignment
of the mortgage and note imports the
existence of the trust and gives notice
thereof to all into whose hands the instrument comes, as has been expressly
decided by this court."
So in the case of Bundy v. The Town
of Monticello, 84 Ind. 119, a trustee of
the town had rightfully sold its bonds
and deposited the money received in a
bank, which was credited to him as " J .
C. W., trustee." The bank failed ; it
was held that the town was entitled to
recover the full amount of the bank remaining to his credit, although the general creditors would receive but a small
percentage of the amount of their de.
posits.
The case of Baker v. The N. Y. Nat.
.Exchange Bank, 100 N. Y. 31; s. c.
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2 N. E. Rep. 452; affords another example of this branch of the subject. In
that case certain consignees to whom
goods had been sent for sale, were insolvent, and they deposited the amount due
their consignors on such goods in the
bank in their own name, adding "agents"
for the purpose of protecting their principals, and entered the deposit as a
trust fund, with the knowledge of the
bank; and afterwards drew a check
upon the bank in settlement of the balance due to their principals upon such
cash sales made by them as their agents.
The bank received and honored the
check, treating the funds as the property
of the agents of the consignees, and to
this the depositors consented. It was
held that the bank must honor the check,
although the money deposited was not
the specific proceeds of such sales ; that
it would not avail the bank as a defence
to an action by the consignors on refusal
to pay the check that the account represented not only the proceeds of the consignors goods but. of other persons not
before the court. The court said the
"title to the goods until sold remains in
the principal; and when sold the proceeds, whether in the form of money
or goods or other securities, belong to
him, subject to a lien of the commission
agent for advances and other charges.
The agent holds both the goods and the
proceeds upon an implied trust to dispose
of the goods according to the direction
of the principal, and to account for and
to pay over to him the proceeds from
sales. The relation between the parties
in respect to the proceeds of sales is not
that of debtor and creditor simply. The
money and securities are specifically the
property of the principal, and he may
follow and reclaim them as long as the
identity is not lost, subject to the rights
of a bona fide purchaser for value. In
ease of the bankruptcy of the agent,
neither the goods northeir proceeds would
pass to his assignees in bankruptcy for
general administration, but would be

subject to the paramount claim of the
principal. Those principles seem to be
well established."
Third. Another question in which it
may be sought to reclaim moneyis where a
deposit has been made in a bank at a time
that it is in an insolvent condition. If
the bank took the money, knowing at the
time that it was insolvent, and that there
was no probability of its being able to
refund the full amount when demanded
by the depositor, it commits a palpable
fraud upon him, and the title of the
money no more passes than if an insolvent purchaser should buy goods knowing that he would not be able to pay for
them; or if he were to buy them not
having any intention to pay for their
value. In neither case would the title
pass, and in both instances the purchaser
and depositor might recover back the
thing sold or the money deposited ; but
if the bank knew it was insolvent, yet
had grounds to believe that it would be
able to refund the money in full at any
time the depositor might demand it, then
no fraud was committed, and the depositor in such an instance does not stand
in the same position as if the bank had
knowingly committed a fraud upon him.
Thus, in Terhune v. The Bank, 34 N.J.
Eq. 367, the facts were as follows: On
Tuesday, Nov. 9th 1886, the directors of
a bank discovered that the cashier had
embezzled its funds, but not to such an
extent as were then supposed, so as to
render the bank insolvent, and they continued business. On the next day a customer of the bank deposited money and
checks of another bank, and these checks
were credited as so much cash in his
pass-book, and on Thursday the bank
failed ; it was held that he could not
recover the amount deposited, and that
he would be treated as a general creditor.
Fourth. It has been said by an eminent
authority, that " the general proposition
which is maintained both at law and in
equity upon this subject, is, that if any
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was obtained from a third person upon
the check, or from the safe of Van Alen
and Rice ? In either case the money is
the principal, no change of that state
the proceeds of the check and stands in
and form can divest it of such trust, or
lieu of it."
give the agent or trustee converting it,
This is a question where the agent owed
or those who represent him in right (not
a fiduciary relation to the fund, and its
being bonafide purchasers for a valuable
consideration without notice), any more relationship has been defined as follows :
"It is one in respect to which if wrong
valid claim in respect to it than they
arise, the same remedy exists against the
respectively had before such change ;" 2
Story Eq., sect. 1258. Following this wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as
would exist -against a trustee on behalf
principle, it was held in Van Alen v.
American National Bank, 52 N. Y. 1, of the cestui que trust :" Ex parte Dale 6Co., 11 Ch. Div. 778.
that where a~ents sold bonds for their
In the case just cited, Chief Justice
principal, and rcceived a check in payFRY disapproves of the principle which
ment and applied it to their own use,
permitted the following of the trust fund
and they immediately deposited money
in the bank for their principal, that the when that fund had been mingled with the
moneys of the trustee, instead of being
principal could recover the amount of
separately deposited in the bank or in
the bank, and the bank could not hold it
Afterwards
other places of security.
against him on the ground that the agents
the entire subject was discussed in The
owed it.
The court, after saying that the pro- Matter of Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696; it
was there decided that if money held by
ceeds of the trust fund may be followed
a person in a fiduciarycharacter, though
and recovered, said : IIIt is claimed,
however, that this principle is not ap- not as a trustee, has been paid by him to
his account at his bankers, the person for
plicable, because the identical money for
which the bonds were sold was not de- whom he held the money can follow it,
and has a charge on the balance in the
posited. This objection would be fatal
banker's hands, although it was mixed
if there had in fact been no substitution
of other money for the proceeds of the with his own moneys; and in that parbonds. * * * The point made, is this : ticular the court overruled the opinion in
Ex parte Dale. It was also hel that the
A., having $100, the proceeds of a sale
rule in Devaynes v. Noble, (Clasjton's
of property of B., intends to place it in
Case), I Mer. 572, appropriating the
a repository and keep it for B., and infirst drawings to the first payments,
stead of putting the identical bank bills
does not apply ; and that the drawer
in the designated place, substitutes others
must be taken to have drawn out his own
of the same amount and keeps thcm for
money in preference to the trust money;
B. as such proceeds, can there be a doubt
and in that particular, Pennell v. Deffell,
that the $100 thus substituted would oc4 DeG., M. & G, 372, was not followed.
cupy the same position as the particular
The Master of the Rolls, in speaking of
bills obtained for the property, and that
the general doctrines of equity, allowing
they would be impressed with the same
the trust fund to be followed, and refertrust? Suppose Van Alen and Rice had
ring to the old rule upon this subject, said:
got the check cashed by a third person
" The modern doctrine of equity as reand deposited the money, it would of
gards property disposed of by a person
course be regarded as the proceeds of
in a fiduciary position, is very clear and
the check, and belong to the plaintiff as
well settled. You can, if the sale was
effectually as the check itself. Does it
make any difference whether the money rightful, take the proceeds of the sale, if
property in its original state and form,

is covered with a trust in favor of
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you can identiry them. If the sale was
wrongful you can still take the proceeds
of the sale in a sense adopting the sale
for the purpose of taking the proceeds,
if you can identify them-there is no
distinction, therefore, between a rightful
and a wrongful disposition of the property so far as regards the right of the
beneficial owner."
In the case of Ex parte Richdale, 19
Ch. Div. 409, it was held that when a
customer pays a check to his banker with
the intention that the amount of it shall
be at once placed to his credit, and the
bankers carry the amount to his credit
accordingly, they become immediately
holders of the check for value, even
though the customer's account is not overdrawn.
The case of Balbach v. Frelinghuysen,
15 Fed. Rep. 675, arose in New Jersey. In that case it was held as follows : that checks deposited in a bank by
the customer for collection, do not at
once become the property of the bank;
the bank continues to be the agent of the
customer until the collection of the check,
which remains, in the meantime, the property of the depositor.
The rule is different when such checks
are deposited to make good an overdrawn account of the customer, or when
the amount deposited by check is immediately drawn against it: in that case,
the bank may hold the deposit until the
overdraft is made good from the same.
The endorsement by the customer of a
check, deposited for collection, is only
intended to put the property in such
shape that the bank may collect it, and
not to thereby pass the title to the bank.
The practice which has grown up among
banks to credit deposits of checks at
once to the account of the depositor, and
to allow him to draw against them before
the collection, isa mere gratuitous privilege, which does not grow into a binding
legal usage.
The plaintiff sought to offset the
amount oftheir credit on the books of a
VOL. XXXV.-I I

defunct bank, against the promissory
notes received by the bank for discount
before its failure. It was held, that if
the bank held the notes at the time of its
failure, and was entitled to receive the
amounts due thereon when they matured,
such offset might be made ; but an offset
of this kind could not be allowed where
it appears that the notes were not the
property of the bank at the time of its
failure, but had been endorsed away for
value.
No knowledge by any of the officers
of a bank of its insolvency is sufficient
to avoid a transaction between the bank
and the customers, on the ground of
fraud, unless tho evidence clearly shows
that the directors, who represent the corporation, also had such knowledge. See
also Hoffman v. First National Bank, 20
Rep. 113 ; German-American Bank v.
Third N tional Bank of 31issouri, 18
Alb. L. J. 252 ; Bank v. King, 57 Penn.
St. 202.
The following language used by the
Master of Rolls in Ex pare Dale, supra,
is instructive : ' Supposing the trust
money was 1000 sovereigns, and the
trustee put them into a bag, and, by nis.
take, or accident, or otherwise, dropped,
a sovereign of his own into the bag,
could anybody suppose that a judge in
equity would find any difficulty in saying that the cestni que trust has a right to
take 1000 sovereigns out of that bag? I
do not like to call it a charge of 1000
sovereigns or the 1001 sovereigns, but
that is the effect of it. I have no doubt
of it. It would make no difference if,
instead of one sovereign, it was another
1000 sovereigns ; but if. instead of putting it into his hag, or, after putting it
into his bag, ie carries the bag to his
bankers, what then? According to law,
the bankers are his debtor for the total
amount ; but if you lend the trust money
to a third person, you can follow it. If,
in the ease supposed, the trustee had lent
the 1000 sovereigns to a man, without
security, you could follow the debt and
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take it from the debtor. If he lent it on
a promissory note, you could take the
promissory note; or the bond, if it was
a bond. If, instead of lending the-whole
amount in one sum simply, he had added
a sovereign, or had added 500 of his
own to the 1000 sovereigns, the only
difference is this, that, instead of taking
the bond or promissory note, the cestui
qua trust would have a charge for the
amount of the trust money on the bond
or promissory note. So it would be on
the simple contract debt ; that is, if the
debt were of such a nature as that between the creditor and the debtor, you
could divide the debt into two, so as to
show what part was trust money, then
the cestui qua trust would have a right to

a charge upon the whole."
Again the Master of the Rolls said:
" The moment you get a substantial portion of it [the money] furnished by the
trustee, using the word " trustee" in the
sense I have mentioned, as including all
persons in a fiduciary relation, the right
to the charge follows. That is the modern
doctrine of equity. Has it ever been
suggested until very recently, that there
is a distinction between an express trustee, or an agent, or a bailee, or a collector
of notes, or anybody else in a fiduciary
position ? I have never heard, until
quite recently, such a distinction suggested. * * * It can have no f,undation in
principle, because the beneficial orvnership is the same, wherever the legal ownership may be. If you have goods bargained and sold to a man upon trust to
sell and hand over the net proceeds to
another, that other is the beneficial owner;
but if instead of being bargained and
sold, so as to vest the legal ownership in
the trustee, they are deposited with him
as agent, so that the legal ownership remains in the beneficial owner, can it be
supposed, in a court of equity, that the
rights of the beneficial owner are different, he being the entire beneficialowner
in both cases ? I say on principle it is
impossible to imagine there can be any

difference. In practice we know there is
no difference, because the moment you
get into a court of equity, where a principal can sue an agent as well as a cestui
qua trust can sue a trustee, no such distinction was ever suggested, as far as I
am aware. Theretre, the moment you
establish the fiduciary relation, the modern rules of equity, as regards following
trust money, apply.
"I will take the case of a pure bailee.
If the bailee sells the goods bailed, the
bailor can in equity follow the proceeds,
and can follow the proceeds wherever
they can be distinguished, either being
actually kept separate, or being mixed up
with other moneys. I have only to advert to one other point, and that is this,
supposing, instead of being invested in
the purchase of lands or goods, the moneys were simply mixed with other
moneys of the trustee, using the term
again in its full sense as including every
person in a fiduciary relation, does it
make any difference according to the
modern doctrine of equiry? I saynone.
It would be very remarkable if it were
to do so."
In this conflict of authority, whom
shall we follow ? It seems to tue writer
that the rule contended for by the Master
of the Rolls, In the matter of Hallett, supra, is the proper one. Wly should the
distinction be drann between a perverted
trust fund, and one that is not ? If you
follow a fund that has been perverted by
the trustee, why not a fund that has not?
Is the equity of the receiver of a fund
which has been perverted any stronger
than the receiver of a fund that has not
been perverted ? Why should it be necessary that a tort should be committed
upon the fund before the beneficiary can
follow it ? The only assignable reason
is, that in the latter instance, the actual
owner never consented that the fund
should be placed in the hands of its custodian ; while in the former there is an
assent on his part implied by law. Why
we should make a difference, or why this

POWELL v. COMMONWEALTH.
fund should be more favored than the
other, it is difficult to see. The true rule
is that if the fund is impressed with the
character of a trust fund it can be fol-

lowed ; if it is not, it cannot be recovered.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
POWELL v. COMMONWEALTH.
The General Assembly is invested with full power to legislate for the protection
of the public health, or to prevent the adulteration of articles of food, as well as
imposition or fraud in the sale of such articles. In the absence of any constitutional
inhibition or limitation, the sovereign power of the state to enact laws for the public
good, appears to embrace these subjects of legislation ; but, however, that may be,
they are fairly within the police powers of the state.
Under the police power the legislature may prohibit the manufacture, sale and
keeping with intent to sell a substance designed to take the place of another as an
article of food, if in their judgment the protection of the public from injury or fraud
requires it.
The judiciary may not pass upon the wisdom or necessity of the legislative prohibition, and the fact that the prohibited substance in a pure state may be whole
some is irrelevant to the question of the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly
prohibiting its manufacture and sale.
The Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 21st May 1885, P. L. 22, entitled "An
act for the protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration of dairy products, and fraud in the sale thereof," and which prohibited the manufacture out of
any oleaginous substance or any compound of the same, other than that produced
from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, any article designed to take the
place of butter or cheese, produced from pure unadulterated milk or cream from the
same, or of any imitation or adulterated butter or cheese, and which prohibited also
the sale, offer of sale, or possession with intent to sell such substance as an article of
food: Hdd, constitutional.
ERROR

to the Court of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin county.

D. T. Watson and Weiss and Gilbert, for plaintiff in error.
. Carroll Brewster and B. C. 3frurtrie,for certain manufacturers and dealers.
Hall J' Jordan, S. J. H M carrelland Wayne Mae Veagh, for
defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STERETT, J.-Tn his opinion overruling the motion for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment, the learned president of the Quarter Sessions has so fully and conclusively vindicated the correctness
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of the rulings complained of in the several specifications of error,
that the judgment may well be affirmed for the cogent and satisfactory reasons there presented. He has shown, very clearly we
think, that the Act of May 21st 1885, under which plaintiff in
error was indicted, is not in conflict with any provision of either the
state or federal constitution, and that the General Assembly, in
enacting the law, did not transcend the limits of legislative authority; but, if there should be any doubt as to the constitutionality of the act on either of these, or any other ground, that doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the act, as a proper
exercise of legislative power. As was said in Brie 4 . .B.Bd.
v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287-300, " The right of the judiciary to
declare a statute void, and to arrest its execution is one which, in
the opinion of all courts, is coupled with responsibilities so grave
that it is never to be exercised except in very clear cases. One
department of the government is bound to presume that another
has acted rightly. The party who wishes to pronounce a law unconstitutional takes upon himself the burden of proving beyond
all doubt that it is so. Or, as the principle is tersely stated by the
late Chief Justice SHARSWOOD, "Nothing but a clear violation of
the constitution-a clear usurpation of power prohibited-will justify the judicial department in pronouncing an act of the legislative
department unconstitutional and void :" Penn. Bd. v. Riblet, 66
Penn. St. 164-169. In same case it is further said: "We cannot
try the constitutionality of a legislative act by the motives and
designs of the lawmakers, however plainly expressed. If the act
itself is within the scope of the authority, it must stand."
These principles are necessary incidents of the law-making power.
In creating a legislative department and conferring upon it the
legislative power, the people must be understood to have conferred
the full and complete authority, as it rests in and may be exercised
by the sovereign power of any state, subject only to such restrictions as they have seen fit to impose, and to the limitations which
are contained in the Constitution of the United States. The legislative department is not made a special agency for the exercise of
specially defined legislative powers ; but is intrusted with the general authority to make laws at discretion: Cooley's Const. Lim. 87.
The Act of May 21st 1885, is entitled, "An act for the protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration of dairy
products and fraud in the sale thereof."
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It cannot be doubted that the General Assembly is invested
with full power to legislate for the protection of the public health,
or to prevent the adulteration of articles of food, as well as imposition or fraud in the sale of such articles. In the absence of any
constitutional inhibition or limitation, the sovereign power of the
state to enact laws for the public good, appears to embrace these
subjects of legislation; but, however that may be, they are fairly
within the police powers of the state. These powers, as described
by Judge REDFIELD, in Thorpe v. Rd., 27 Vt. 149, extend "to
the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within the state, * * *
and by which persons and property are subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right to do which
no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles,
ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
The statute books of this and other states furnish numerous examples of the exercise of the power referred to; but perhaps the
laws most nearly identical in principle with our act are those which
prohibit the sale of adulterated provisions. The sale of pure milk
and pure water mixed may be made a penal offence: Com. v. Earren, 91 Mass. 489; Same v. Waite, 93 Id. 264; or adulterated
confectionery:
om. v. Chase, 125 Id. 202; Same v. Evans, 132
Id. 11.
The statute of Massachusetts declares, 1 Whoever sells or keeps
or offers for sale adulterated milk, or milk to which water or any
f6reign substance has been added," shall be punished, &c. In
Com. v. Parren,supra, it was held under this statute, that guilty
knowledge on the part of the seller need not be averred or proved.
In Com. v. Waite, supra, the contention was that inasmuch as it is
innocent and lawful to sell either pure milk or pure water, or both,
separately, the legislature has no power to make the sale of milk
and water when mixed a penal offence, unless it is done with a
fraudulent intent. But the court said, "It is notorious that the
sale of milk adulterated with water is extensively practised with a
fraudulent intent. It is for the legislature to judge what reasonable
laws ought to be enacted to protect the people against this fraud,
and to adapt the protection to the nature of the case. The court
can see no ground for pronouncing the law unreasonable, and has
no authority to judge of its expediency."
Speaking of the
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prohibition liquor law of Massachusettb, passed in 1869, the
Supreme Court of the United States says: "If the public
safety or the public morals requires the discontinuance of any
manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed
from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience
which individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are held
subject to the police power of the state. Whatever difference of
opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police
power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the
protection of the lives, health and property of the citizens, and to
the preservation of good order and the public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide
for these objects. They belong emphatically to the class of objects
which demand the application of the maxim, " Saluspopulisuprema
lex;" and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself:" Beer
Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25.
So far as the constitutionality of the act under consideration
depends on the police power of the state, it may safely be rested on
the principle underlying the cases above referred to and those that
might be cited. The manufacture, sale and keeping with intent to
sell may all alike be prohibited by the legislature, if in their judgment the protection of the public from injury or fraud requires it.
To deny the authority of the legislature to do so is to attack all
that is vital in the police power. To refuse recognition of the
power in a given case, because, in the judgment of some, the legislature, though acting within its proper sphere, may have mistaken
the public necessity for a law, prohibitory in its character, is to
make the individual judgment superior to that of the legislature,
to which the people in their sovereign capacity have delegated the
law-making power.
The fact that the prohibited substance in a pure state may be
wholesome and not injurious is irrelevant in a judicial inquiry.
The wholesomeness will not render the act unconstitutional. The
statute is intended to prevent fraud and protect the public health
by prohibitiig the manufacture and sale of substances and compounds which furnish the temptation to commit the former, and
which may be injurious to the latter. As was said by the Supreme
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Court of Missouri in State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110, that to render the law unconstitutional, the prohibited articles must be unwholesome, would utterly overthrow the police power of the state,
overthrow every law the wisdom of which could not bear the test
of scrutiny.
The case last referred to arose under a statute similar to ours.
entitled, "An act to prevent the manufacture and sale of oleomarginous substances or compounds of the same, in imitation of pure
dairy products." In a well-considered opinion, the constitutionality
of this act was sustained by the Court of Appeals (12 Mo. App.
Rep. 214-228) and afterwards by the Supreme Court of that state:
State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110. "The mere fact," as was said in
that case, "that experts may pronounce a manufactured article, intended for human food, to be wholesome or harmless, does not render it incompetent for the legislature to prohibit the manufacture
and sale of the article. The test of the reasonableness of the police
regulation, prohibiting the making and vending of a particular article of food, is not alone whether it is in part unwholesome and
injurious. If an article of food is of such a character that few persons will eat it knowing its real character; if at the same time, it
is of such a nature that it can be imposed upon the public as an
article of food which is in common use, and against which there is
no prejudice; and if, in addition to this, there is probable ground
for believing that the only way to prevent the public from being
defrauded into the purchasing of the counterfeit article for the genuine, is to prohibit altogether the manufacture and sale of the former,
then we think such a prohibition may stand as a reasonable police
regulation, although the article prohibited is in fact innocuous, and
although its production might be found beneficial to the public, if
in trying it they could distinguish it from the production of which
it is the imitation."
The manufacturer may brand it with its real name. It may
carry that brand into the hands of the broker or commission
merchant, and even into the hands of the retail grocer; but
there it will be taken off, and it will be sold to the consumer as
real butter, or it will not be sold at all. The fact that in the present state of the public taste, the public judgment or the public
prejudice with regard to it, it cannot be sold except by cheating
the ultimate purchaser into the belief that it is real butter--stamps
with fraud the entire business of making and vending it, and fur-

88

POWELL v.COMMONWEALTH.

nishes a justification for a police regulation prohibiting the making
and vending of it altogether :" State v. Addington, supra.
In view of these and other considerations suggested in the opinion referred to, and also in that of the court below, we cannot say
the act in question is not a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. The legislature was doubtless satisfied that the manufacture
and sale of the prohibited articles were prejudicial to the public
good to such degree that a remedy was needed; and we have no
right to say that a penal statute, less severe and sweeping in its
terms, would have afforded an effective remedy. That is a legislative and not a judicial question. If it is thought the legislature
erred in the solution of that question, the proper course is an appeal
to them to correct the error, if any there was.
For reasons above suggested and others more fully elaborated by
the court below we think the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed and record remitted.
GORDON, J., dissented.
The police power of the state has been
defined by judges of the Federal Courts,
as the state's sovereign power, or power
to make laws at discretion, subject only
to the definite constitutional restraints:
City of New York v. Miln, I1 Pet. 102;
License Cases, 5 How. 504; Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 125.
The state courts, without defining it,
have characterized it as the power to
legislate for the health, comfort, morals,
and general prosperity of the people :
Thorpe v. Rutland 4- Burl. Rd., 27 Vt.
140 ; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 85. The
latter description of the power, it will he
noticed, limits it to a power to make
laws for the public good.
The difference in breadth between the
definitions is apparent rather than real,
for the courts generally, state as well as
federal, agree in giving to the state legislature all power excepting as it is expressly or impliedly withheld by the
written constitutions.
Although there
are numerous dicta, some by distinguished judges to the contrary: (.4furyland University v. Williams, 9 Gill &

J. 408 ; Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
225; Ham v. McClaws, 1 Bay 98;
Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657 ; Loan
Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655;
State v. Addington, 12 Mo. App. 214)
it is now generally held that acts of the
state legislature can not be declared
void by the courts, merely because they
may be deemed contrary to natural justice, or to principles of republican gov.
ernment, or to the spirit of the constitution. The words of the constitution
furnish the only test to determine the validity of legislative enactment: Sharptess v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Penn. St.
147 ; Penn. Rd. v. .iblet, 66 Id. 164;
Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie,
34 N. Y. 657 ; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74
Id. 509 ; 1Fisher v. McGuir, 1 Gray I;
State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.) 612;
Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552 ; Winch v.
Tobin, 107 111. 212 ; People v. Galtagher,
4 Mich. 244; Court of St. Louis County
v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; State v.
Mugler, 29 Kan. 252; Cooley's Const.
Lim. *168.
The protection of the citizen against
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arbitrary legislation, without reference to
a public purpose, is mainly to be found
in the clause contained in various modified forms in the federal, and all the state
constitutions, providing that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, save by the judgment of his peers
or the law of the land.
The phrases
" due process of law," and "the law
of the land," as applied to legislative
proceedings, have been held to limit the
legislature's control over the liberty
and property of individual citizens to
measures that concern or have some relation to the public welfare: People v.
.3arx, 99 N. Y. 377; State v. Addington, 12 Mo. App. 214; Hawthorn v.
People, 109 Ill. 302.
The extent of judicial control over
legislative discretion, is limited to an inquiry into the public purpose of particular acts, and such public purpose is
presumed. But when acts of the legislature, by which liberty is taken away or
property is forfeited, destroyed or made
less valuable, are clearly seen by the
courts to have no basis in a public purpose, they are declared unconstitutional
as opposed to the above restrictions.
Thus, in In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, an
act of the legislature of New York was
declared unconstitutional, as depriving
of liberty (the liberty of choice of occupation), which under the title of 'An act
to improve the public health by prohibiting the manufacture of cigars, and preparation of tobacco, in any form in certain
cases," prohibited certain persons from
exercising a lawful and not unhealthy employment, with no possible or conceivable
advantage to the public arising from the
prohibition. So, in Districtof Columbia
v. Saville, I McArthur 581, the proprietors of theatres, having by statute,
been forbidden to reserve seats in their
theatres, excepting in case they were sold
previous to the opening of the performance, the court held the act unconstitutional, as in no sense a police regulation
designed and calculated to benefit the
VoL. XXXV.-12

public, but an unwarrantable interference
with the rights of private property. See
State v. Fisher, 52 Mo. 174.
The difficulty in certain cases is in determining whether laws ostensibly designed to advance the public welfare, are
not, in fact, wholly in the interest of
private parties.
In the celebrated
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, it
was decided by a bare majority of the
Supreme Court of the United States,
that a state law which gave a monopoly
of the business of keeping a slaughter
house in 1154 square miles of territory,
to one corporation, was sufficiently public in its nature, as relating to the public
health, to come within the police power.
The "oleomargarine" cases are recent
illustrations of the difficulty referred to.
The Supreme Court of .Pennsylvania, in
the principal case, and the courts of Missouri in State v. Addington, 12 Mo. App.
214, and 77 Id. 115, declared the constitutionality of statutes, which absolutely
prohibited the manufacture and sale of
a food product of wide use, because of
their apparent design to promote the
public morals, by preventing fraud in
the sale of one article for another, whereas the Court of Appeals of New York,
reversing the Supreme Court of that state,
declared such a statute unconstitutional,
because, in the opinion of the court, it had
no relation to the public health or public
morals, but designed to, and in effect
did, prohibit one lawful industry for the
sake of protecting another.
If a statute is seen to be public in its
design and scope, and not in fact a private one under the guise of a public
measure, the discretion of the legislature
is almost limitless in declaring what shall
.and what slall not be the rights of the
people, in respect to any particular species of property, or any particular claim
of privilege. The assertion is sometimes
made that the state's power over the liberty and property of its citizens, is limited to the regulation of property, and
does not extend to the p'oibtion of
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possession and sale. This view would
seem to be untenable. Rigid prohibitory
liquor laws have been held constitutional,
or recognised as such, in the following
states: Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa and Kansas ; Cooley's Coast.
Lim. 582 n. I and 2 ; State v. Mugler,
29 Kan. 252. And the Federal Court
have decided that the absolute prohibition
of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks is not contravened by anything in the Constitution of the United
States: Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S.
201 ; Beer Company v. M.assachusetts, 97
Id. 25 ; Batemeyerv. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129.
Vested rights of property may not be
taken away. Thus liquor in existence
at the time of the passage of a -prohibitory liquor law may not be destroyed or
made valueless: Wynehamer v. People,
13 N. Y. 378; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74
Id. 509.
How far property in existence at the
time of the passage of a prohibitory law
is protected against incidental injury
thereby is perhaps an open question.
A brewery lost nine-tenths of its market value by reason of the enactment of
a prohibitory liquor law in Kansas.
judge BREWR, of the United States
Circuit Court for the district of Kansas,
held that such a loss of value was a deprivation of property without due process
of law, within the meaning of sect. I of
art. 14 of the Constitution of the United
States: State v. Walr.f, 26 Fed. Rep.
178. Whereas Judge McCoy in the
Northern District of Georgia, had previously held that such an incidental injury to property was not within the protection of the constitution : Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865. This would
appear to be the better position and the
one more in harmony with the view taken
by thl Supreme Court of the United
States, that so long as any use of property incidentally injured is left to the
owner, there is no deprivation of property
within the meaning of the constitution :

Beer Company v. 1lassachusetts,97 U.S.
25. See also note to State v. WValrugf,
in 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases 395. The
rule is thus stated in Munn v. Penple, 69
Ill. 80 : "No one is deprived of his property within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition, so long as be retains
its title and possession."
In Afahin v. Pfeiffer, 27 Fed. Rep.
892, where a lease had been made of
premises to be occupied for the sale of
ale, wine and beer, containing a clause
that the lease should be forfeited unless
so occupied, and before the expiration of
the term of said lease, an act of the legislature of Iowa was passed and went
into effect, prohibiting the sale of ale,
beer, &c., and imposing penalties for
violating said law, it was held that this
was a deprivation of property within the
ruling : State v. WValruff. It was said
that there is no difference between the
destruction of leasehold and other kinds
of property by retrospective legislation.
This case may be sustained in accordance with the ruling of Weil v. Calhoun
and other cases, on the ground that the
value of the lease was totally destroyed
by the prohibitory act.
The effect of the act under discussion
in the principal ease in diminishing the
value of machinerv and buildings adapted
for the manufacture of oleomargarine,
was raised in the argument, but was not
specifically considered by the court. The
weight of authority, as seen above, does
not sustain the objection to the act because of this incidental injury. The
recent " milk" cases illustrate the extent
to which property may be deprived of
value by the state under its police power.
In State v. Smyth, 14 R. I. 100, it
was decided that a law establishing an
arbitrary standard of purity for milk,
below which it could not be sold, was
constitutional. It was objected that if
the natural milk of cows happened to be
very thin and below the standard, the
deprivation of the sale of such milk was
an unjust discrimination against the
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owner. It was answered, however, that
the sale of naturally thin milk as good
commercial milk was as much a fraud as
if it were actually watered. There was

Watertown v.

layo, 109 Mass. 315.

The business of washing in public laun-

dries within prescribed territorial limits,
may be prohibited within certain hours:
no deprivation of property in taking
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 ; Soon
from the owner of a cow giving very Eing v. Crowley, Id. 703. If the inthin milk the right of sale of the milk,
hibition relates to all persons, it does not
since, as intimated by the court, the cow
matter that it is limited in its scope to
had still some value as an "irrigator,"
a certain locality: Soon fling v. Crowley.
if not as a milk producer. See the folThe strength of the position of the
lowing cases, where laws establishing an
Court of Appeals of New York, and of
arbitrary standard of purity for milk the dissenting judge in the principal
have been declared constitutional: Corn.
case, that these prohibitory oleomargarine
v. .Euans, 132 M1ass. 11 ; State v. New- laws are unconstitutional, rests on the
ton, 45 N. J. L. 469 ; People v. Cipperly, ground that it is the right of every Amer101 N. Y. 634, reversing the Supreme
ican citizen, to adopt and follow such
Court in 44 N. Y. S. C. 319. The disemployment, not injurious to the commusentirg opinion or LEARNED, P. J., in
nity, as he may gee fit, and that it is an
this last case, followed by the Court of
unwarrantable interference with his libAppeals, states what may be regarded as
erty to deprive him of this choice of octhe correct rule as to laws of this kind to cupation : Lwe Stock, 4-c., v. Crescent
be, that where the object of a law as
City, I Abb. U. S. 398 ; People v. Marx,
gathered from its terms is actually to supra. This latter position is conceded
promote the public health and not under by the courts holding the other view, who
the guise of that to protect another indus- discover in every act of the kind, whose
try, the law passed is valid, even though constitutionality they affirm, the prohibiit interferes with the liberty or property tion of an employment which may be inof the individual. But incidental projurious to the community. The legislatection that is given by such a law to tures of the states being the sole judges
other industries will not invalidate the of what is conducive to the public health
law if ir is clearly a police ;neasure.
and morals, it only remains for courts to
Slaugtcr-Ruouse Cases.
restrain them when, by no possible inThe right of the legislature, under the tendment the acts in question can have
police power, to interfere with the liberty relation to their professed public purpose.
of employment of the citizen, has often
The opponents of such laws are also met
been affirmed. It is seen in the prohibiwith the point that their argument is
tory liquor laws and in the restraint in
really an effort to have the courts inquire
the exercise of apparentlyharmless trades.
into the motives or the legislature, which
They may be kept within certain bounds,
cannot be done, unless the acts in quesas to space, or within certain periods as tion are plainly evasive : Sunbury 4to time. Thus the butchering of three Erie Rd. v. Cooper, 33 Penn. St. 278 ;
large parishes, in Louisiana, was con- People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 545 ; Soon
fined to one localty: Slauylter House fing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 7 03 ; Cooley's
Cases. So the legilature, it was held in
Const. Lim. *187.
See upon the genMassachusetts, may prohibit the use of
eral and special subject, two learned and
any building for carrying on, without per- critical notes in People v. Marx, 9 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 491, and State v.
mission of the mayor or selectmen, a
trade necessary and lawful in itself, as Snyth, 51 Am. Rep. 344.
that of slaughtering, but which in its orA. H. VINTERSTEEN.
dinary exercise, may become a nuisance :
Philadelphia.
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United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Illinois.
PRATHER

ET AL. v.

KEAN

ET AL.

Where a bank holds bonds as collateral security, it is obliged, as bailee for reward,
to exercise that degree of care in their safe keeping which any reasonably prudent
and cautious man would exercise in the care of his own property of the same kind.
But if the custody of the bank is only that of a gratuitous bailee for safe keeping, it
is not liable for loss unless such loss resulted from its gross carelessness.
Where an employee of a bank occupies a position of trust and great importance,
it is gross negligence in his employers not to discharge him, or place him in some
position of less responsibility, when they discover that he has been engaged in
speculating in stocks and grain.

Jackson and Robert Hervey, attorneys for plaintiff.
and John P. Wilson, attorneys for defendants.
Hoyne
H
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRESHAM, J.-The plaintiffs, who were bankers at Maryville,
Mo., opened an account, in 1873, with the defendants, who were
bankers at Chicago, and this relation continued until the spring of
1883. Interest was allowed the plaintiffs on their deposits above a
certain amount at the rate of 21 and 3 per cent. per annum, and
the deposits averaged from $200,000 to $400,000 a year. On July
7th 1880, the defendant sold to the plaintiffs $12,000 of 4 per cent.
government bonds, for which the latter paid, including premium
and accrued interest, $13,005. The letter which the plaintiff wrote
ordering the purchase concluded thus: ".You will please send us
description and numbers of the bonds, and hold same as special
deposit for us." In the account which the defendant rendered to
the plaintiffs, of the purchase, the latter were informed that the
bonds were held as a special deposit, subject to their order. The
numbers of these bonds appeared upon the bond register, which the
defendants kept, and they remained in their custody until sbme time
between November, 1881, and November, 1882, during which period
they were stolen by their assistant manager, Ker, who disappeared
on January 16th 1883, and this suit is brought to recover their value.
On October 8th 1880, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants,
"Would it be convenient for you to discount for us, say up to par
of our bonds with you as collateral, and if so, at what rate ?" And
in reply to this, on October 11th, the defendants said: "We will
discount for you with pleasure, taking your government bonds at
par as collateral." On December 22d the defendants discounted
plaintiff's note for $12,000, and on the same day notified them that
Lyman
Horton

'
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the bonds were held as collateral security for the loan. This note
was renewed, and when it became due, on April 27th 1881, the
defendants wrote the plaintiffs, "We debit you $12,000 for your
note due to-day, which please find enclosed cancelled. What disposition shall we make of the collaterals ?" The answer to this
letter was not produced, but Robinson, one of the plaintiffs, testified
that he directed the defendants to "hold the bonds as formerly for
our (plaintiffs') use," and to furnish a list of them, giving numbers.
On May 5th the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs: "Your favor
of the 2d inst. at hand. We hold $12,000 U. S. 4 per cent. as
special deposit," giving the numbers and informing the plaintiffs
the bonds were held subject to their further orders. On October
11th 1882 the defendants discounted the plaintiffs' note for $10,000
at sixty days, receiving as collateral security therefor a number of
notes given to the plaintiffs by their customers. This note was paid
at maturity, and the collaterals returned.
Robinson testified, that in a letter which he wrote to the defendants asking for the last loan, he informed them the plaintiffs preferred giving the notes of their customers in place of the bonds as
collateral, as they wished to use the bonds in case of emergency.
He also stated that after the purchase of the bonds the plaintiffs
bad overdrawn their account from time to time, and that their overdrafts had been honored. On November 24th 1880 the plaintiffs
wrote to the defendants : "We are carrying a large amount of hogs
and cattle at this time for our customers, and we shall wish to overdraw our account for a small amount, and we will thank you to
honor the same, and will consider our bonds in your hands as
security for the same. We do not wish to overdraw, but stock may
be detained on the road," and two days later the defendants replied:
"Yours of the 24th inst. received. In reply we beg to say should
you have occasion to check on us as you suggest, we will pay your
checks with great pleasure."
Robinson testified that; on January 16th 1883, he wrote to the
defendants asking for another loan of $10,000 on the notes of their
customers, as the plaintiffs wished to keep the bonds for emergencies, meaning to meet overdrafts as previously. On January 29th
the defendants replied to this letter, apologizing for the delay which
had occurred through oversight on the part of their corresponding
clerk, saying: "We telegraphed you to-day that it is all right,
meaning to say that your request for discount is granted." If the
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defendants did not know when they wrote this letter that Ker had
stolen the bonds they had abundant reason for believing he had.
On March 5th 1883 the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs : "Do
your books show that you should have a special deposit of government bonds with us ; if so, what issue of bonds, and what amount ?"
to which the plaintiffs replied on March 8th, "We refer you to
your advice of July 7th 1880, in regard to our bonds held by you."
Kean, one of the defendants, told Robinson, in July 1888, so
the latter testified, that he, Kean, did not know until about the
middle of January of that year that Ker had stolen the bonds. At
the time the plaintiffs demanded their bonds, or their equivalent,
there was nothing due from them to the defendants; and the latter
refused to comply with the demand, on the sole ground that the
bonds were held as a special deposit without reward, and that they
were not liable for their loss.
Ker acted as book-keeper for about ten years previous to May
1881, when he became assistant cashier at a salary of $2000 a
year. The plaintiffs' bonds were kept in the " treasury" part of
the safe, where the securities and reserve or surplus funds, not in
active use, were kept. Ker took $21,500 of the defendants' funds,
and $85,500 in bonds, including those sued for. Kean also testified
that he did not know when the plaintiffs' bonds were last seen in
the vaults; that it was their habit to examine their securities and
count their cash every month, and to examine their special deposits
twice a year to see that they corresponded with the amounts marked
on the envelopes and were otherwise correct; that the collaterals
and special deposits were kept together ; that Ker took none of the
collaterals, presumably because he was aware of the habit of the
bank to examine them and the cash ; and that no record of the
numbers of bonds held on special deposit was kept, and they could
not be counted and checked off.
More than a year before Ker left, the defendants were cautioned
that some one in their bank was speculating on the Board of Trade.
Kean testified that after receiving this caution, he made a quiet
investigation, and the facts pointed toward Ker if any one; that he
thereupon called Ker up and accused him of having been so speculating, to which he replied: "I have made a few transactions, but
I am not doing anything now, and do not propose to do anything
more." He admitted that what he had done was against the rules
of the bank, and said: "I know I ought not to do it, and I am not
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going to do any more of it. I am ahead a thousand dollars, all
told." Ker's salary appears to have been his only income. The
defendants do not claim that he had accumulated any means or
property from this or any other source, or that they thought he
had, and yet they retained him in his position, which afforded him
access to their own assets as well as the securities of others, without
making any efforts to verify the truth of his statements, or ascertain whether he had been tempted to appropriate to his own use the
property of others.
About two months before he left, Preston, one of the defendants,
residing at Detroit, wrote to the bank at Chicago, calling attention
to reported speculations of some of the employees on the Board of
Trade, suggesting inquiry upon the subject and directing that a careful examination be made of their securities of all kinds. On receipt
of this letter, Kean told Ker what he had heard, and asked if he
had not been speculating again on the Board of Trade? Ker said
he had made some deals for friends in Canada, for which he had
received a brokerage, and that the transactions were all ended. The
defendants then seemed to entertain suspicion of Ker's integrity,
and an examination of their books and securities was commenced.
No effort was made, however, to see whether the special deposits
had been disturbed. Kean testified that the special deposits,
including the plaintiffs' bonds, were not examined, because no
record was kept of them by numbers or otherwise; although the
proof shows that the numbers of the plaintiffs' bonds did appear
upon the defendants' bond register at the time of the purchase.
If the bonds were held as collateral security at the time they were
stolen, the defendants were obliged as bailees for reward to exercise
that degree of care in their safe keeping, which a reasonably prudent
and cautious man would exercise in the care of his own property of
the same kind. It does not follow that they are not liable, if they
were as diligent in caring for these bonds as they were in taking
care of securities of their own, for they may have been careless of
the latter. If, however, the custody of the defendants at the time
the bonds were stolen, was only that of gratuitous bailees for safe
keeping, they are not liable for the loss unless it resulted from their
gross carelessness: National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699.
When the first loan for which the bonds were pledged as security
was paid, and the defendants inquired what should be done with the
collaterals, they were directed by the plaintiffs to hold them as
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formerly for the plaintiffs' use and forward a list of them by numbers.
The direction was not that the bonds he held as a special deposit,
or for safe keeping. Evidently, the defendants were informed that
the plaintiffs expected to use the bonds, as they had already been
used, namely, as collaterals, and in informing the plaintiffs that the
bonds were held as a special deposit, subject to their further orders,
the defendants doubtless intended to be understood as willing to hold
the bonds as collateral security for future loans. The two banks had
been in uninterrupted business relations for a number of years;
during the greater portion of which time there was a balance, varying in size, with the defendants in favor of the plaintiffs. The
defendants deemed this account desirable and valuable. They cut
off the coupons as they matured, and placed the amount to the
plaintiffs' credit. While therefore, the bailment was for the convenience of the plaintiffs, it came about in the course of business
between the two banks, and it was for their mutual benefit. If it
be conceded, however, that the bonds ceased to be held as collaterals
when the $12,000 note was paid, and they thereupon became a mere
special deposit, the character of the bailment was changed by the
subsequent agreement, whereby they remained in the custody of
the defendants as a continuing security for advances made, and to
be made, to the plaintiffs.
The defendants were distinctly informed, that in order to accommodate, on short notice, such of their customers as were dealing in
cattle and hogs, the plaintiffs might from time to time desire to
overdraw their account, on the security of these bonds as collaterals;
and in order that they might be held for such emergencies, the defendants discounted paper executed by the plaintiffs on the pledge
of notes of the latter's customers. The evidence shows that this
agreement continued in force until Ker fled, and that after it 'was
made the plaintiffs did make overdrafts on the defendants, all of
which were paid, some of them only a few months before Ker's dishonesty was discovered. If these overdrafts were not paid on the
security of the bonds, they were paid without security, which is not
to be presumed in the absence of proof. The defendants made
frequent examinations to see that their own cash and securities were
correct, but, according to their own testimony, neglected any examination with a view of ascertaining whether or not the plaintiffs'
bonds had been disturbed.
The right of the defendants to hold the bonds against the plain-
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tiffs and all others, as collateral security for any balance due to them
from the plaintiffs, is too plain to dispute; and it follows that having
this right, their responsibility was that of pledgees.
It is immaterial, however, whether the defendants were bailees
with or without reward, as in either case they are liable for the value
of the bonds, the loss having resulted from their gross negligence.
The defendants knew that Ker had been engaged in business which
was hazardous, and that his means were scant. The demoralizing
effect of speculating in stocks and grain-more properly speaking,
gambling on the rise and fall of the price of stocks and grain-is
seen in the numerous speculations, embezzlements, forgeries and
thefts plainly traceable to that cause. Ker had free access to valuable securities, which were transferrable by delivery, easily abstracted
and converted, and yet he was allowed to retain his position without
any effort to see that he had not converted to his own use the property of others, or that his statements were correct. An immediate examination would have doubtless shown that even then some
of the plaintiffs' bonds had been exchanged for others, if indeed they
had not been stolen. Ker's position was one of trust and great
importance; his own admission showed that he was not trustworthy
for such employment, and it was gross negligence in the defendants
not to discharge him, or place him in some position of less responsibility : Scott v. Nat. Bank, 72 Penn. St. 471 ; Third Nat. Bank
v. Boyd, 44 Md. 47; Cutting v. Murlor, 78 N. Y. 454.
The principles involved in the above
case are well settled. The case, however,
is of such practical importance as to
merit attention. To the point that a
mere special depositary, where the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailor,
is liable only for what most of the books
call gross negligence (though we do not
approve the use of the epithet "gross"),
see Edwards on Bailments, H 45, 46,
47 ; Story on Bail.,
88, and cases
cited ; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass.
479 ; Smith v. First. Nat. Bank, 99 Id.
605; Mirst Nat. Bank v. Graham, 79
Penn. St. 106 ; Lancaster Co. Bank v.
Smith, 62 Id. 47 ; Scott v. Nat. Bank,
72 Id. 471 ; ."rst Nat. Bank v. Ocean
Bank, 60 N. Y. 218; Maury v. Coyle,
34 Md. 235 ; ChattahooclheeNat. Bankv.
Schley, 58 Ga. 369.
VOL. XXXV.-13

Where, however, the deposit with
the bank is as collateral security, the
bailment is for the benefit of both
of the parties, and the bailee must use
ordinary care : Jenkins v. National
Village Bank, 58 Me. 275 ; Dearborn v.
Union Nat. Bank, 61 Id. 369. The case
of Scott v. Nat. Bank, 72 Penn. St. 471,
bears a close resemblance to the principal
case. In this case the bank received
bonds on special deposit for safety from
one of its customers and at his risk, and
placed them in a safe with similar deposits of others, and with its own securities. The bonds were stolen by a teller.
It was considered that the theft by the
teller was not connected with his employment, and that there was no liability on
the bank unless it knew or had reason to
suspect that he was not trustworthy.
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After the teller had absconded it was discovered that his accounts were false and
that he had robbed the bank for two years.
It was held, however, that the failure to
discover this did not render the bank liable, as the bank was not bound to examine the teller's accounts for the benefit of
a depositor, who was a gratuitous bailee.
In this case it appeared, also, that the
absconding teller had borne an excellent
reputation, that the bank officers accidentally discovered that he had on one
occasion dealt in stocks, but upon inquiry
of his broker had been informed that he
had made one small purchase, and had
done well by it; and the broker, in whom
the bank officers had confidence, promised that if he dealt further the bank
officers should be informed. No other
dealings were heard of till after the larceny of the bonds. Upon this state of

facts it was held that the purchase and
sale of stocks was not ipsofacto evidence
of dishonesty ; but that if the officer had
been found engaged in stock gambling,
or buying and selling beyond his means,
he should have been immediately dismissed. Upon the whole case the judgment of the court below in favor of the
bank was affirmed. The principal case
differs from this case in this, that the bank
officers had notice that the defaulting officer in the principal case had been speculating upon the board of trade, in other
words gambling, which would bring the
principal case directly within the authority of the case of Scott v. Nat. Bank,
supra. Upon the whole, then, we are of
the opinion that the principal case was
correctly decided.
M. D. EwaLa.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
IN RE PETITION OF KLAUS, &c.
The duties of a secretary of a corporation, in regard to making transfers of corporate stock, are purely ministerial, and he has no right to inquire into the motives
of the parties to a transfer.
A by-law of a corporation, which prohibits the transfer of stock by a stockholder,
without the consent of all the stockholders is against public policy and void.
No exception can be made in the application of this rule on the ground that
the stockholders of the corporation are few, and were originally co-partners, and
the one against whom the by-law is invoked consented to and voted for it ; nor can
any exception be made as to corporations formed under chap. 144, Laws of Wisconsin,
1872, on the ground that the power to make such a by-law is to be implied from
sect. 13 of that act, as the act was repealed by the revised statutes.

APPEAL from Circuit Court, Brown county.
Petition for an order compelling C. A. Willard, the secretary of
the E. E. Bolles Wooden-Ware Company, a private corporation, to

make a transfer of stock on the books of the company to petitioner.
The order was granted and the respondent appeals.
ffudd

Wiginan, for respondent.

-Ellis, Green & Merrill,for appellant.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
ORTON, J.-The petitioner, Anton Klaus, presented his affidavit
to the Circuit Court, under sect. 1752 Rev. Stat., by which it appeared, in substance, that one R. A. Meiswinkle was the owner of
one share of stock in the E. E. Bolles Wooden-Ware Company,
and held the stock certificate thereof, and that, on the 6th day of
February 1886, said Meiswinkle sold, assigned, endorsed and
delivered said stock and the certificate thereof to the said petitioner.
And it further appeared, by said affidavit, that on or about the day
aforesaid, said petitioner applied to one C. A. Willard, who was
then the secretary of said company, and in possession of the books
of the same, to have said certificate duly transferred upon said
books according to said assignment, and such transfer duly entered
upon the same, pursuant to sect. 1751 Rev. Stat., and that said
Willard neglected and refused, for more than two days, to transfer
on the stock books of said company said stock, and still neglects
and refuses to do so, for the sole reason that such transfer was not
made with the consent of all the stockholders of said corporation.
The object of the affidavit was to procure an order against said
Willard to show cause why he should not enter the said transfer
upon said books. The said Willard attempted to show cause by
stating, substantially, in his affidavit, that the stock of said company was not transferable by endorsement and delivery, but that,
according to a by-law of the company, no transfer should be made,
and no new certificate issued, except by the consent of all the stockholders, and such consent had not been obtained or given to such
transfer to the petitioner, and that said Meiswinkle voted for said
by-law and consented thereto; and by stating further that, on the
9th day of February 1886, said certificate of stock was brought to
him, with a pretended assignment on the back thereof to the petitioner, purporting to have been made on said 6th day of February
1886, and that, on information and belief, said transfer had never
been delivered to him, said petitioner, but that it was brought to
the affiant by one George Marsden, to whom it had been just delivered by said Meiswinkle; and that the object of the petitioner, in
attempting to have said transfer entered upon the books of the company was to enable said Meiswinkle to accomplish some design of
his own, and that the petitioner does not intend to become an active
stockholder, or to own and hold stock for his own benefit, but
purely for the advantage of Meiswinkle.
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These statements, even on information and belief, do not deny
the dae and legal transfer, by endorsement and assignment of the
stock, as stated in the petitioner's affidavit, nor the delivery thereof
to the petitioner, nor the application by the petitioner for its transfer on the books, for Marsden's action was clearly on behalf of the
petitioner. This would hardly be a denial of the positive statements
to that effect in the affidavit of the petitioner. The other statements in the affidavit of Willard are matters of argument and not
of facts material to this issue under the statute. Among the papers
in the case, there is a notice by Willard, as secretary of the company, to the petitioner, dated February 9th, 1886, that he declined
to enter the transfer upon the books in compliance with said bylaw. This is the reason stated also in his affidavit. It is now too
late to state other reasons, if even they would otherwise be valid,
for his refusal. But the other reasons are entirely insufficient.
Whatever may have been the motives of Meiswinkle in making his
transfer, it is of no concern to Willard. His duties are purely
ministerial and clerical in' entering upon the books transfers of
stock. He certainly has not the judicial power to pass upon the
motives and intentions of the parties to the assignment of stock:
Helm v. Swiggett, 12 Ind. 194; State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266.
The only material question is as to the validity of the by-law
which prohibits the transfer of the stock of the company without
the consent of all the stockholders. This is an important question,
but the principles involved have been so clearly established by a
vast preponderance of the authorities, that I shall not attempt to
treat it as an original question resting upon the general powers of
a corporation, or on the reason of the rules so established. It is
claimed by the learned counsel of the appellant, in his argument
and brief, of great ability and plausibility, that this company is
governed by chap. 144 of the Laws of 1872, and not by chap. 85
of the revision of 1878, and that sect. 13 of chap. 144, authorizing the transfer of the stock of the companies organized under
said chapter, on their books, "in such form and under such limitation as the by-laws shall prescribe," warrants the by-law in question
limiting such transfers to cases to which the consent of all of the
stockholders has been obtained. That section was especially revised
and superseded by sect. 1751 Rev. Stat. See Reviser's Notes, p.
137. That chapter was especially repealed by the revisers, p.
1151. By sect. 1791, Rev. Stat., it is provided that corporations
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heretofore organized under any general law "shall have the same
powers as if lawfully organized under this chapter, and be governed
by these statutes." This does not mean that such corporations shall
have the same powers conferred by such general law, but such
powers as it may have if organized under this chapter, and the last
clause makes this meaning clear.
We must, therefore, look to the Revised Statutes as to the power
of this corporation to place limitations, restrictions, conditions or
prohibitions upon the free transfer of its stock upon its books. The
above language is not found in sect. 1751, Rev. Stat. Such power,
therefore, does not exist by virtie of any law, or by the articles of
incorporation, but solely in the general power to make by-laws.
But chap. 144, Laws of 1872, under which this company was organized, in many of its sections would seem to imply the free and'
independent right of the assignees of stock, duly transferred, to
have such transfers entered upon the books of the company in all
cases. Sect. 14 prescribes the liability of the assignees and assignors. Sect. 15 requires the stock books to remain open for inspection, in order to inform those interested who the present stockholders are; and sect. 17 provides that any creditor is entitled to
be informed who the stockholders are. These provisions are inconsistent with the exercise of a prohibitory power of the corporation,
by by-laws or the articles of incorporation, to prevent the entry of
transfers of stock in the books actually made, and which are valid
between the parties. There is a distinction between the stockholders, whether original or by transfer of stock, and the directors
of the corporation. The directors may make by-laws-not the
stockholders. The enactment of by-laws is a corporate, not an
individual act.
The argument of estoppel on Meiswinkle. as a stockholder, or as
an original partner in the business before it was organized into a
corporation, on account of his agreement to abide by such restriction, and his assent thereto, can have no force when applied to him
as a director of the company: Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20;
s. c. 20 N. W. Rep. 667. The stock of this private corporation,
by said sect. 13, is made personal property, and transferable on
the books of such corporation, and by the Revised Statutes it has
all of the incidents of personal property. To deny the right to
have transfers of stock, actually made, entered upon the books of
the corporation, would be impairing the rights and in fraud of the
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creditors of the stockholders, who have the common-law right to
resort to any of the property of their stockholding debtor for the
satisfaction of their claims. The debtor owns the stock, by purchase and assignment of the certificate, to all intents and purposes, but such transfer is void as to his creditors, unless entered
upon the books. Sect. 1751, Rev. Stat. ; In re Murply, 51 Wis.
519 ; s. c. 8 N. W. Rep. 419.
The refusal of Willard, the secretary, to enter this transfer upon
the books, keeps this property of the petitioner liable for the debts
of Meiswinkle, and beyond the reach of the creditors of the petitioner. This would seem to be a strong, if not a conclusive, reason
that the exercise of such power of prohibition is void, as to creditors at least, and so far against public policy and unlawful.
It is again very plausibly argued by the learned counsel of the
appellant, that what might be against public policy in a public or
quasi public corporation, would not be in a strictly private corporation, and that the latter corporation was in substance only an incorporated partnership. We cannot give countenance to any such distinction. The policy of incorporating, a strictly private business,
with a limited liability of the stockholders towards their creditors,
is at least questionable. But when a private business or partnership
has become incorporated under the general law, and greatly favored
by privileges and franchises, and by restricted liability, there is no
reason for making any distinction between such a corporation and
others, and our statutes make none. The corporators have secured
the advantages of a corporation, and they should be governed by
all the other incidents of a corporation. Why not ? They cannot
be a corporation, and still remain in respect to the same business a
copartnership; the one must completely displace the other. We
cannot, therefore, be governed by any authorities which make such
a distinction. The stockholders, directors and officers cannot act
as partners or be personally bound as partners. The corporators,
if formerly partners in the same business, and the partnership, are
merged in the corporation, not partially, but fully and completely.
A similar argument was made in the late case of Bank v. u c-DonaZ
Offy. Co., 28 N. W. Rep. 225; and it was claimed that such a
strictly private corporation was entitled to more legal indulgence
in respect to its creditors, but such a claim was disallowed. As a
partner, a person may sell his interest in the partnership property,
but he does not sell his interest in the partnership as such, and he
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may bind himself to his copartners by his agreement; but, as a
stockholder, he is in no sense the owner or part owner of the partnership property. His stock represents his interest in the corporation and that is made property by the statute: Button v. 1offman,
supra. His individuality is merged in that of a stockholder. His
stock is not only property, but private property, and he may do
with it as he pleases. There is no community of interest in the
different stockholders to form the basis of a good consideration for
a contract between them as to the disposition of their stock.
Enough, and perhaps too much, has been said on general principles, and once for all we hold that a by-law of a corporation which
prohibits the transfer of stock by a stockholder, without the consent
of all of the stockholders, is void as against public policy. It is an
unwarrantable and unlawful restriction upon the sale of personal
property, the sale and interchange of which the law favors, and in
restraint of trade. I have already said that the transfer is valid to
all intents and purposes, as between the parties, without the entry
thereof in the books of the company. So the statute provides (sect.
1751, Rev. Stat.), but, as to third persons and the public, it is void,
unless so entered in the books. Its sale, full and complete, may
thus be prevented by the will and at the option of another who.has
no interest in it. The claim is against all reason and justice.
When the law makes stock personal property, it clothes it with all
the incidents of personal property, and the owner has full dominion
over it, and may dispose of it at will. That such a by-law as that
under consideration is void as against public policy, nearly all of
the authorities seem to hold: Ang. & A. Corp., sect. 567; Low
Transf Stock, sect. 48; Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers' and
T.aders' Bank, 20 N. Y. 501 ; Sargent v. Ins. Co., 8 Pick. 90 ;
Chouteau S. Co. v. Harris,20 Mo. 882; Quiner v. Ins. Co., 10
Mass. 476; Bond v. Mt. Hove Co., 99 Id. 505; Case v. Bank,
100 U. S. 446; and many cases cited in brief of respondent's
counsel, and many more that might be cited.
It is claimed that this case ought to be made an exception, because the original stockholders were the former copartners, and they
three ought to have the right to choose their associates in the business, as it took all of them to be directors and officers. That
might be so in this case, but the principle would not apply to
other cases of private corporations where the stockholders were
more numerous, and hence there would be an exception to a general
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rule for personal reasons. But it is not proper to say that stockholders, as such, are associates in the management of the business. They
have nothing to say about the business, any further than to protect
their interests. The directors and officers manage the business. As
stockholders, they are in no sense partners.
We are satisfied that the Circuit Court decided correctly, and
properly granted the order to compel the secretary, Willard, to
enter the transfer of this stock to the petitioner in the books of the
corporation. The order of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
quired without deed, by adelivery of the
certificate with an endorsement upon it
for a valuable consideration, and that in
such cases, the legatee, heir or assignee,
would be entitled to have the transfer
made in the books, and to a certificate of
his property. Accordingly held, that abylaw which limits the transfer of stock to
be made only at the office personally, or
by an attorney and with the assent of the
president, would be in restraint of trade,
and contrary to the general law of the
commonwealth, which permits the right
to personal property and incorporeal
hereditaments to be transferred in various other ways.
Weston's Case, wherein it is held that
the directors of a corporation have no
power to refuse to permit a transfer of
stock, because the address of the transferree is not correctly given : Weston's Case,
In re Smith, Knight 4- Co., L. R., 4 Ch.
21. And even where the transfers of
stock are made to add to the voting
powers of a certain class of stockholders,
this does not authorize the directors to
refuse to register such transfers when
they are made in good faith : n re Stranton I. S. Co., L. R., 16 Eq., 559. The
same view was taken in C. 6- A Rd. v.
Elkins, 37 N. J. Eq. 274, wherein it was
held, that directors of a corporation, who
act in office, cannot dispute the right of
a stockholder to have a new election of
directors held in accordance with the bylaws, on the ground that the stockholder
bought his stock with the money of rival
companies, and intended to use his legal
tate to his heir, and which may be acPROHIBITIONS OF THE TRANSFER OF

STOC.-Stock in corporations, being a
species of personal property, the owner
of it has all the rights which are incident
.to the ownership of personal, and indeed
any kind of property. Especially has
he the right to dispose of it by sale, gift,
or bequest.
As remarked by Judge
ADAMS, in foore v. Bank of Commerce,
52 Mo. 377-379, speaking of stock in
corporations: " The right of alienation
is an incident of property, and a by-law
prohibiting this right, or imposing any
restritions on its exercise, would be in
restraint of trade and against public
policy, and therefore void." This is the
general rule with reference to shares in
companies. And besides the reason of
public policy which underlies it, it may
be pointed out that one of the very reasons why corporations are created, is in
order to enable persons to take shares,
preserving to themselves the right to
dispose of such shares at their pleasure,
thus to relieve themselves of responsibility for the company: Weston's Case,
In re Smith, Knight 6- Co., L. R., 4 Ch.
21. See, also, Gilbert's Case, 5 Id.
559.
Illustrating the general rule that a
shareholder has the right to dispose of his
stock as he pleases, reference may he
made, also, to the following authorities :
Sargent v. FranklinIns. Co., 8 Pick. 95,
wherein it is held that shares of stock are
personal property which may be conveyed
by will, or might descend from an intes-
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rights as a holder of a majority of capital
stock, for purposes detrimental to the interests of tile corporation, and that the
proposed election of directors is a step
towards the illegal control of the property
and the business of the corporation.
In another case, a company with unlimited liability was formed in 1843,
under a deed of settlement, and was
afterwards provisionally registered, 7 &
8 Vict. c. 110. By their deed of settlement no shareholder was to have more
than twenty votes, however large the
number of shares held, and the directors
had power to approve or disapprove of
any person proposed by a shareholder as
transferree of his shares. A difference
arose among the shareholders as to the
management of the company, and the
plaintiff, who was a large shareholder,
transferred some of his shares to one
person, for value, and other shares to
another person, as trustee for himself, in
order to increase his voting power. The
directors refused to approve of the transfers, not from any personal oljection to
the transferrees, but on the ground that
the transfers were colorable, and were
intended to increase the votes of the
transferror; held, that the company was
not a mere partnership, but came within
the laws applicable to joint-stock companics; and that the directors had no
power to refuse a transfer, which was a
right of propprty, except on personal objection to the transferree. They were,
therefore, ordered to approve of the transfer : Moffat v. Farqular,7 Ch. Div. 591.
As this case suggests there would probably
be a different rule applied in the case of
transfer of shares, in a partnership,
which, although possiblylike a company,
in respect to having shares of capital
stock (ordinarily, however, partnerships
are not organized with shares of stock),
are yet unlike a company in this : In a
partnership there is an element of personal association which furnishes a reason, and confers a right to each partner
to object to the admission into the firm,
VOL. XXXV.-14

of persons who may be personally disagreeable to the objecting partner, while
in a corporation no such element or
right ordinarily exists. We say "ordinarily" advisedly, for there are companies in which, by the charter, a right
is reserved to directors to pass upon the
qualifications of proposed members.
And under such circumstances it has
been held that the directorsare not bound
to disclose their reasons for rejecting a
transferree, which the charter gives them
power to reject, provided they have fairly
considered the question at a meeting of
the board, and in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, the courts will take it
for granted that the directors have acted
reasonably and in good faith, in refusing to sanction a transfer : In re Greshant
Life Ins. Society, LEx parte Penney, L.
R., 8 Ch. 446.
But while the proposition may be accepted as settled, that when the charter
of the corporation authorizes, the directors of a company may refuse to sanction the transfer of its stock, such power
of the directors must be exercised reasonably, they cannot arbitrarily refuse.
This was decided in Robinson v. CharterBank, L. R., 1 Eq. Cas. 32, in which
case it was queried whether it is a reasonable ground of objection to transfer
of stock, that the proposed transferree is
nominee of a rival bank, with which the
shares have been deposited as security.
A similar ruling was made in Smith v.
Canada Car Co., 6 U. C. P. R. 107, in
which case RICHARDS, C. J., said of the
directors: "I do not think they have
any such power; if permitted to exercise
such power they would, in effect, prevent
the transfer of shares, which the statute
and charter clearly contemplate, and
arbitrarially control the value of the property of the stockholders."
And the
learned chief justice further intimated,
that when no reason is assigned for the
refusal of the directors to permit a transfer of stock, mandamus ought to go to
compel them to do what they ought to do.
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But persons buying stock, in order to
bring actions for past wrongful acts of
directors, are not favored by courts of
equity, or of law. " Such parties are
regarded as interlopers, seeking to dispute the rights of innocent holders of
stock to their prejudice, and should not
be allowed to have or retain injunctions
when their rights can be preserved by
awarding damages for such injury as
they may have sustained."
See also,
The Queen v. Liverpool, Manchester, Pc.,
Rd., 21 L. J., Q. B. 284.
We conclude this branch of the subject
under consideration, by affirming the
general rule to be, that stockholders have
an unquestionable right to alien or dispose of their stock according to their
own wishes. By this, however, it is not
meant to say that the transfer of stock
may not be regulated so as to protect
the company and its stockholders against
fraudulent transfers of stock, or so as to
secure to the company payment by a
stockholder desiring to transfer his stock

of any debt due from him to the company, whether such debt be an unpaid
balance due on the stock he wishes to
transfer, or any other debt. For these
purposes, a company may require transfers to be registered on its books, and
the law on this subject is illustrated by a
multitude of authorities. See, amongst
others, Chouteau v. Harris, 20 Mo. 383;
Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo.
377; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8
Pick. 90 ; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. N. 0.
Transp. Co., 13 Fed. R. 516; Hazard
v. National Bank of Newvport, 26 Fed.
R. 94; Robinson v. CharteredBank, L.
R., 1 Eq. 32 ; and many other decisions
may readily be found. But in them the
power to regulate the transfer of stock is
clearly distinguished from the power to
prohibit such transfer. Reasonable regulation is well established by argument,
equity and precedent. Prohibition, on
the other hand, is clearly contrary to
law and public policy.
ADELBEnT HAM1LTON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
HAMLIN v. SCHULTE.
Where a real estate broker is employed to find a purchaser of real estate, but not
to execute a contract on behalf of the seller, he is entitled to his commissions where
it appears that he has found a purchaser ready, able and willing to complete the
purchase, in accordance with the terms agreed upon, between the broker and the
owner, although the latter is unable to consummate the sale by reason of his wife's
refusal to sign the deed.

ASSUMPSIT brought by real estate brokers to recover commissions for procuring a purchaser of certain real estate of defendant
upon the terms set by him. Plaintiffs made a written contract on
behalf of the parties to the contract, in which it was provided that
the wife should join in the deed, which was read to defendant, and
assented to by him. It appeared that she refused to join, and defendant was thereby unable to carry out the contract. All the
transactions leading to the agreement were conducted by plaintiffs.
The defendant denied his liability, and judgment was entered for
him, whereupon plaintiffs appealed.
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W. B. Hfale, for appellants.
Ueland, Shores & Hfolt, contra.
VANDERBURGHI, J.-It

is insisted by the defendant that the com-

piaint does not show that the plaintiffs have earned their commissions, or procured a purchaser ready and willing to take the property upon defendant's terms, because his wife is made a party to
the agreement without her authority, and that defendant could
only be bound by a contract with himself alone; but we think it
was competent for defendant, assuming to act for himself and wife,
to employ the plaintiffs and authorize them, as real estate brokers,
to procure a purchaser upon the terms alleged to have been authorized or ratified by him, and, among other things, to provide that
his wife should join in the contract or deed in order to assure the
acquisition of her interest and a clear title. He could make such
terms if he chose to do so, whether he was able to comply with
them or not, as respects his wife's interest. That would be a matter
which would concdrn him, and not his agents. The plaintiffs were
not employed to make the final contract between the parties, but to
find a purchaser for the property; and the memorandum made by
them may be considered, for the purposes of this case, as in the
nature of a proposition submitted to the defendant, including the
terms and conditions of the purchase; and, independently of the
extent of the agents' authority in the first instance, he might ratify
or modify it if, as the final result of the negotiations, it appears
that they have procured a purchaser for the property upon the defendant's terms. The complaint should be held sufficient, and the
mere fact of his refusal or inability to procure his wife's assent or
signature to the deed or contract, ought not, as between him and
them, to be held sufficient to defeat the action. It is plain enough,
if the complaint be true, that the defendant understood the terms
of the contract just as they were understood by the plaintiffs and
the purchaser, and that the conditions of the proposed sale required
his wife to join in it. It was necessary that the wife should join
in order to give the purchaser a good title ; and the provision in
the contract had respect to the title. And this was the view of the
case taken by this court on the former appeal (31 Minn. 488),
where it was held that it was no valid ground of objection to a
recovery by plaintiffs that the contract required the wife to join,
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but it did not then appear that the terms of sale were otherwise in
conformity with defendant's instructions.
The rule is well established that the broker is entitled to recover
his compensation where a purchaser, procured through his agency,
is able, willing, and ready to complete the purchase on the terms
mutually stipulated between the parties, although through the default of the seller, or his inability to fulfil the terms on his part, or
make a good title, no sale is finally consummated: Stillman v.
Mitchell, 2 Rob. 537 ; Holly v. Gosling, 3 E. D. Smith 264 ;
hilton v. Butler, 1 Id. 150 ; Doty v. .J1ller,43 Barb. 529 ; Armstrong v. Wann, 29 Minn. 126, and cases cited; Jones v. Adler,
84 Md. 442; Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306; Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray 401 ; Moses v. Bierling, 31 N. Y. 462; Mooney v.
-Elder,56 Id. 240; Barnardv. litonnot, *42 Id. 205 (3 Keyes);
Lynch v. McJBenna, 58 How. Pr. 42; Koch v. Emmerling, 22
How. (U. S.)
Respondent's main point is that it does not appear that the purchaser was ready and willing to contract with defendant alone, and
that he could not ratify an unauthorized contract on behalf of his wife.
But these objections go rather to the question of the defendant's
ability to fulfil the terms agreed on and contained in the negotiations, and not to the terms upon which plaintiffs were authorized to
procure a purchaser. Such was not the contract contemplated here.
It must have been in the minds of the parties, principal and agents,
and mutually understood, that the wife should join; and we think
it is clear that the terms of their employment would be satisfied if
they found a purchaser ready and willing to purchase, not merely
on the terms agreed as to price and security, but also on the condition that his wife should be bound by the contract. If an executory
contract had been made with defendant alone, in which- he had
stipulated that his wife should join in and be a party to a warranty
deed of the property in order to a perfect title, and she should
thereafter refuse so to do, the purchaser might refuse to complete
the purchase for that reason; and the practical distinction between
such a case and the case at bar would appear to be quite insubstantial, as respects the relations of the vendor and his agents, which
may properly be determined by the stipulations they make between
themselves. If, then, the purchaser in this case was procured upon
terms in conformity with which the vendor assumed to be prepared
to sell, and stipulated for by himself, he ought not to object, as
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against the claim of his agents, that he bad no authority to make
such terms. Otherwise he would be permitted, not only to disappoint the purchaser, but also deprive them of their compensation,
fairly earned, through collusion with his wife, or his inability to persuade her to join in the deed.
Judgment reversed.
In view of the antagonistic positions
of the two classes of cases upon the
main question in the principal case, as to
when a real estate broker has earned,
and is entitled to recover, his commission
for services rendered, with respect to the
sale or attempted sale of real estate, a
review of the authorities will not be without interest.
There are two extreme views which
have obtained in cases of this nature.
One class is to the effect that the broker
has earned his commission the moment
the property is committed to him for sale,
or when it is entered upon his books,
and that the owner thereafter has no control over the property, either for the
purpose of withdrawing it, or to make
sale of it himself, without first paying
the broker his commission; certainly not
unless he specifically reserves this right.
While the second class hold that no commission is due the broker, unless he has
actually consummated the sale.
The leading case of Sibbald v. The
Bethldiei Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378 ; s. c.
38 Am. Rep. 441, announces the correct
principles which should control future
judicial action, in adjusting the rights
of the parties, when this question is presented. Here the defendant employed
plaintiff, a broker, to sell the steel rails
of its manufacture to the Grand Trunk
Railroad Co. After various unsuccessful
negotiations for a sale, carried on during
a period of four months, between that
company and plaintiff, during which defendant had fixed its prices several times,
upon receipt of a telegram from said
company, asking onwhat terms 1000 tons
of defendant's rails would be delivered,
plaintiff telegraphed to defendant asking

its lowest terms. Defendant declined
to fix a price or negotiate further through
plaintiff; and the latter thereupon telegraphed to the Grand Trunk Railroad
Co. that defendant declined to name a
price. Subsequently, a sale was made
by defendant to the Grand Trunk through
another broker. Upon the trial of an
action to recover commissions, the court
was requested to charge that defendant
had the right, under the circumstances,
to refuse to use the services of plaintiff,
if the action was taken in good faith,
and without intent to deprive him of his
commissions. The court so charged, with
the qualification, however, that the defendant had no right, acting either in
good or bad faith, to avail itself of what
plaintiff had done, to make a sale through
other agencies. The Court of Appeals
held that the qualification was error ;
that defendant had a right to terminate
the agency as he did, and if done in
good faith, plaintiff had no right to compensation, although his efforts were of
benefit in the subsequent negotiation.
The court fully discusses the rules of law
controlling brokers' rights to commissions ; pp. 381, et seq. "The duty he
undertakes, the obligation he assumes as
a condition of his right to demand commissions, is to bring the buyer and seller
to an agreement ;" p. 382. His "obligation is fulfilled only when he produces
a party ready to make the purchase at a
satisfactory price." Several expressions
from various courts are set out, and the
court concludes : " But in all the cases
under all the varying forms of expression,
the fundamental and correct doctrine is,
that the duty assumed by the broker is to
bring the minds of the buyer and seller
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to an agreement for a sale, and the price
and terms on which it is to be made, and
until that is done his right to commissions
does not accrue. * * * (p. -383.) It
follows, as a necessary deduction from
the established rule, that a broker is never
entitled to commissions for unsuccessful
efforts. The risk of failure is wholly
his. The reward comes only with his
success. That is the plain contract and
contemplation of the parties. The broker may devote his time and labor, and
expend his money with ever so much of
devotion to the interest of his employer,
and yet, if he fails, if without effecting
an agreement or accomplishing a bargain, he abandons the effort, or his authority is fairly, and in good faith, terminated, he gains no right to commissions. He loses the labor and effort
which was staked upon success. And in
such event it matters not that after his
failure, and the termination of his agency,
what he has done proves of use and
benefit to his principal. In a multitude
of cases that must necessarily result, he
may have introduced to each other parties who otherwise would have never
met; he may have created impressions
which, under late and more favorable
circumstances, naturally lead to and
materially assist in the consummation of
a sale; he may have planted the very
seeds from which others reap the harvest ;
but all that gives him ho claim. It was
part of his risk, that failing himself, not
successful in fulfilling his obligation,
others might be left to some extent to
avail themselves of the fruit of his labors."
After citing WVylie v. Marine Bank, 61
N. Y. 416, as supporting above views,
the court suggests the following qualification : "This, however, must be taken
with one important and necessary limitation.
If the efforts of the broker are
rendered a failure by the fault of the employer; if capriciously he changes his
mind after the purchaser, ready and willing, and consenting to the prescribed

terms, is produced ; or, if the latter declines to complete the contract because
of some defect of title in the ownership
of the seller, some unremoved encumbrance, some defect which is the fault of
the latter, then the broker does not lose
his commisions.
And that upon the
familiar principle that no one can avail
himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has himself occasioned the non-performance."
Wylie v. Marine Nat. Bank, 61 N. Y.
415, may also be considered a leading
case. This was an action by a real estate broker to recover commissions, on
an alleged sale of defendant's real estate.
The broker made several efforts to procure a purchaser, covering a period of
about a week, but did not succeed. Defendant sold the property to one not pro
cured by the aid of the broker. There
was nothing said about the time in
wich the broker was to make sale. It
was held that the broker was not entitled
to commissions.
The following propositions of law are
deduced from the opinion: (I) One who
has emplnyed a broker can himself sell
the property to a purchaser whom he has
produced without any aid from the broker:
Hungerford v. Eicks, 39 Conn. 259. (2)
Before the broker can be said to have
earned his commission he must produce
a purchaser who is ready and willing to
enter into contract upon his employer's
terms : Tombs v. Alexander, 101 Mfass.
255 ; Barnard v. Nornat, 3 -Keys 203.
(3) The broker must be the e ffieient agent
or the procuring cause of the sale. The
means employed by him and his efforts
must result in the sale. He must find a
purchaser, and the sale must proceed from
his efforts, acting as broker : Al tClne v.
Paine, 49 N. Y. 661 ; Lloyd v. Matthews,
51 Id. 124; Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 Id.
235 ; Briggsv. Rowe, 4 Keys 424 ; Afurryv. Carrie, 7 C. & F. 584 ; Urdinson
v. Martin, 8 Id. 5. (4) It is not indispensable that the purchaser should be
introduced to the owner by the broker,
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nor that the broker should be personally
acquainted with the purchaser. But in
such case it must affirmatively appear
that the purchaser was induced to apply
to the owner through the means employed
by the broker. If he was the producing
cause of the sale, his right to compensation will not be affected by the circumstance that the owner was ignorant of it
at the time he entered into the contract
with the purchaser : Sussdorff v. Schluidt,
55 N. Y. 320.
In a recent case in the Kansas City
(Mo.) Court of Appeals, Gaty v. Foster,
18 :o. App. 639, the court, after approving these cases, especially the limitation stated in the first, observed (p. 644) :
"By those cases and by a long list of
adjudicated cases we understand the law
to be that, if the owner of the property
employs a broker to sell it, or to find and
send to him a purchaser for it, and in
the contract of employment prescribes
tile terms and conditions on which the
broker may act in selling or securing a
purchaser, and if the broker does not.
himself sell the property, but does find
and send to his employer one who is
ready, able and willing to buy the property on the terms and conditions prescribed in said contract, and offers so to
do, then the broker has earned his commission and is entitled to it whether the
employer accepts the offer or not. The
employer cannot impose conditions other
than and in addition to the conditions
named in the contract, and under such
circumstances, so as to prevent the broker
from receiving his commission."
A broker claiming a commission must
show an employment, and that the sale
was made by means of his efforts or
agency. His undertaking is to make
efforts to procure a purchaser, and if he
fails he is entitled to no commissions, unless lie has a special contract giving him
a right to them whether a sale is effected
by him or not. But if the purchaser is
found through the instrumentalities of
the broker, as where he is attracted to the

property by maps, signs and advertisements of the broker, the latter is entitled
to his commissions, although the owner
makes the sale, and although the purchaser is not introduced to the owner by
the broker, and the latter is not personally acquainted with such purchaser:
Sussdoiff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319. The
language of the cases is, that the broker
must be the "procuring cause" of the
sale: Moses v. Bierling, 31 N. Y. 462;
McClave v. Paine, 49 Id. 561 ; Woods
v. Stepldns, 46 Mo. 55 ; Green v. Bartlett, 14 Conn. 681. That is. the sale
must be brought about from the acts of
the agent though he does not negotiate or
consummate the sale : Stewart v. Mather,
32 Wis. 644 ; C'oolce v. Fisher, 12 Gray
491 ; Lincoln v. AcClatchie, 32 Conn.
136; s. c. 10 Am. L. Reg. 634, 638,
note; Stillman v. Mitchell, 2 Rob. 523;
as where he gives information to the purchaser, either in person or through agency
employed by him, although the sale is
completed between such purchaser and
the principal without further assistance
or knowledge on the part of the broker
(Carter v. Webster, 79 Ill. 435), or
where the sale results from the agent's
introduction of the principal parties,
or by advertisements of- the agent:
Earp v. Cumanis, 54 Penn. St. 394;
Durkee v. Rd., 29 Vt. 127 ; Burnett
v. Bouch, 9 Car. & P. 620. In short,
it may be stated, generally, that efforts
on the part of the broker which end
in a sale will entitle him to his commissions. See article in 22 Cent. L.J.,
126-129, by H. C" BLACrt, Esq. ; also
article in 16 Cent. L. J. 442-447, by
MURAT W. HoPKIxs, Esq.
The efforts of the broker must bring
the proposed buyer and seller together :
J.7sk v. Henerie (Oregon), 9 Paa. Rep.
322 ; s. c. 9 West Coast Rep. 172;
and if the seller capriciously refuses to
complete the sale, the broker can recover
his commissions : Id. ; Stewart v. Murray, 92 Ind. 543: Vinton v. Baldwin,
88 Id. 194 ; Love v. Miller, 53 Id. 294.

HAMLIN v. SCHULTE.
who represented that he was agent for
certain property, and was ready and willing to make the exchange. The agent,
In Tombs v. Alexander, 101 Mass.
255 ; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 349, the defend- at plaintiff's request, called upon plaintiff's attorney and received information
ant employed the broker to sell real estate for a certain compensation, making concerning the real estate, and the attorknown to him his title. The broker pro- ney introduced this agent to the defendduced a purchaser, and introduced him ant. Negotiations were then entered
into between this agent and aefendant,
to defendant, but no sale was consummated by reason of a defect in defend- which resulted in an exchange of land.
Plaintiff was permitted to recover. In
ant's title. The defendant afterwards
Carpenter v. Rynders, 52 Mo. 278, plainsold the property to another person at
tiff, a real estate agent, was employed by
auction, for more than had been offered
by the first customer. The broker was defendant to sell a house and lot for
$6000. The evidence conflicted as to
denied recovery. In Fox v. Rouse, 47
strongly to
contract, but it "tended
Mich. 558; a. o. 11 N. W. Rep. 384,
show" that plaintiff undertook to sell
the plaintiff had been employed by dethe property for 2j per cent. on the price,
fendant, upon specified terms, to effect a
that plaintiff was to write the deed withsale. He found a purchaser who was ready
out charge, and that nothing was to be
willing, and able to take the land upon
paid unless plaintiff made a sale. Plainthe specified terms. It developed that
tiff effected a sale, satisfactory to defendthe land had been sold by another agent,
similarly employed as plaintiff. The ant, and $100 was paid to defendant, as
court in holding that the broker could re- part payment, but when deed was about
cover, said, p. 560: ,"Fox (owner) may to be made, purchaser found title defectDefendant afterwards obtained
have been unfortunate in employing more ive.
deeds which perfected the title, but in
than one agent, but this was a matter of
his own choosing, and until the authority the meantime the purchaser made different arrangements and refused to take the
given was revoked, they each had a right
house and lot. The $100 was returned
to find purchasers and cam their commisto the purchaser. It appeared that the
sions.2 Tinibemnanv. Craddock, 70 Mo.
538, was an action on an express con- purchaser would have taken the property
at the time, if the title had been good, or
tract-$1000 to be paid for effecting
exchange of a stock of goods owned by if the defendant had perfected it before
defendant, for real estate in Kansas the purchaser bad made different arrangements. The court, in holding that the
City. The agent exerted himself and
agent was entitled to recover, remarked :
used means to bring about the exchange,
"The plaintiff had done all that could
but the negotiations were concluded by
The be done by him, and if the contract and
the parties principal in person.
agent was permitted to recover, as he was sale were defeated by the fault of the
defendant, the plaintiff having done
the " procuring cause" of negotiations
everything on his part that could be done,
which resulted in the sale. Tyler v.
Parr, 52 Mo. 249, 250, was an action is entitled to his pay. See Doty v. Milby a real estate agent to recover com- ler, 43 Barb. 529 ; Topping v. Healy, 3
mission " for procuring exchange of real F. & F. 325. In Bailey v. Chapman,
Defendant placed his land in 41 Mo. 636, WAG E , J., said, p. 538:
estate."
"A. broker employed to make a sale for
plaintiff's hands for sale or exchange,
a commission, is entitled to pay when he
and was to pay therefor a certain commakes the sale according to instructions,
mission. Plaintiff advertised the land
and in good faith, and the principal canand corresponded with a real estate agent,

The following cases will illustrate these
rules:
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not relieve himself from liability, by a effect a sale solely on his own account,
refusal to consummate the sale, or by a he may do s o,but in that event he may
voluntary act of his own disabling him be bound to reimburse any expense the
from performance." See instructions on broker may have incurred by advertising
page 537, especially plaintiffs. See the or otherwise . But unless he contributed
dissenting opinion of WAoNR, J., in to the sale in ade by the owner of the proBudd v. Zeller, 52 Mo. 245, 246, where perty, he is not entitled to commissions.
the defect in title caused failure to con- Commissions , co nomine, can only be
summate the loan : Kock v. Ernmerling, earned by a complete sale; the same as
freight is the mother of wages, and the
22 How. (U. S.) 69. In Lincoln v.
MlfcClatchie, 36 Conn. 136, s. c. 10 Am. completing of the voyage, under ordinary
L. Reg. (N. S.) 634, defendant put in circumstance:s,is required, in order to
hands of plaintiff, a real estate broker, dbmand frei ght.
A few m re cases will be cited to furhis house, for sale for $6500-the plaintiff to receive I per cent. commission if ther illustrat e these conflicting views.
In Kimbern'Yv. Henderson, 29 Mld. 512,
he sold-the defendant to have the right
to sell the house himself, without being 515, it is said that to be entitled to comliable to a commission, and the broker missions, the real estate broker should
was not to advertise. The plaintiff en- havecomplet ed the sale, that is he should
tered the house on his books, and in have found a purchaser in a situation,
December and January following, adver- and ready aud willing to complete the
tised the house fbr sale, on the street up- purchase ace ording to the terms agreed
on which defendant's house was located, on. "The tundertaking to produce a purOne G., living on that street, saw the ad- chaser requilresof the party so undertakvertisement, and desiring a house near ing, not sim ply to name or introduce a
by for a friend, went to plaintiff's office a person whto may be willing to make
and learned that defendant's house was any sort of a contfact in reference to the
for sale. G. told this to his friend, who property, bn tto produce a party capable,
went to defendant direct and purchased and who ultimately becomes the purthe house of him, without seeing the chaser." Here the person introduced by
agent. The plaintiff was allowed a the broker e ntered into an atgreement to
recovery, the court holding that the con- purchase, bu.t failed to consummate it:
tract that plaintiff was to have no com- Richards v. Jackson, 31 Md. 250, 252,
mission if the defendant sold the house, 253 ; s. c.I Am. lep. 49, fully sutains
meant a sale to a purchaser found by the the ruling of"the last case. In AlcGarsck
defendant, wholly without the plaintiff's v. Woodlief, 20 How. (U. S.) 221, 227,
procurement. There is a valuable note is the following language: "The broker
appended to this case, as reported in 10 must comple te the sale ; that is, he must
Am. L. Rceg.(N. S.) 637-638, in which find a purch aser in a situation and ready
the doctrine of this case is fully approved,
and willing to complete the purchase on
The writer, after referring to and stating the terms ag reed on, before he is entitled
the two extreme views which have ob- to his commi ssions, then he will be entitained in this class of eases (as above tled to them ,though the vendor refuse to
given), says: "The truth seems to lie goon and perfect the sale." In De Sanbetween these extremes, and in the pre- tos v. Taney , 13 La. Ann. 151, 162, it is
cise line indicated in the opinion. The held that th e right to commission, upon
broker may pursue his own mode in find- a sale, depe ids entirely upon the compleing a purchaser ; and there is, probably, tion of the sale, and the commission is
an implied understanding, that if the not due un :il a sale is executed; here
vendor shall withdraw his property, or there was a misunderstanding between
VoL. XXXV.-15
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the agent and the proposed purchaser,
as to the payment of taxes, &c., on the
property. On rehearing the court said
that the broker was not entitled to recover, because of his neglect " to stipulate clearly concerning the taxes,"
that is, there appeared to have been no
"perfect bargain" between the broker
and purchaser. The court also said that
it was not necessary that the consideration should have passed, but "I consider
the brokerage earned as soon as the broker has effected a complete bargain between the parties."
See Mr. Justice
SPAPFORD's

dissenting opinion.

The doctrine of these cases is that unless the failure to purchase of the person
introduced results from the fault of the
vendor, the broker is not entitled to commission. In other words, that there must
be a complete sale before commissions are
earned and payable.
The doctrine of these cases is, obviously
illogical and unjust. Why should the
broker not be entitled to his commission
because he has not performed that which
he has not the power to perform ? The
broker's undertaking is not to make a
complete sale. Indeed, this could not
be, for he has not the power to make the
transfer of the property : Ryon v. .3cGee, 1 Am. Law Mug. 351. His right
to commission "depends upon his successful performance of the service and
upon nothing else :" Barnard v. Mfonnat, I Abb. Ct. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 108,
109. "The duty of the broker consisted
of bringing the minds of vendor and
vendee to an agreement. He could do
no more. He had no power to execute
a contract, to pay the money for the one
side, to convey the land on the part of
the other, or to compel the performance
by either of their duties. The plaintiff
produced a purchaser, ready ind willing
to accept the terms of the defendant and
able to perform the obligation on his part.
He bad then earned his commission, and
it would be a singular conclusion of the
law, that the refusal of the employer to

complete the bargain should destroy his
right to them :" Id.

In McClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561,
563, defendant employed plaintiff, a real
estate broker, to negotiate sales of three
parcels of land, at a specified price for
each. Plaintiff effected a sale of one
piece for which he received his commission. Subsequently, defendant sold one
of the remaining parcels, upon the same
terms that he had instructed plaintiff to
sell it; but plaintiff took no part in the
sale and gave no information to the purchaser concerning it. So far as appears,
he knew nothing about it until after the
sale. In a suit for commissions he was
denied a recovery (p. 563) : " To earn
his commission the broker must be an
efficient agent in or the procuring cause
of the contract. His commission is
earned by finding a sufficient purchaser,
ready and willing to enter into a valid
contract for the purchase upon the terms
fixed by the owner, and having introduced such a one to the owner as a purchaser, is not deprived of his right to
commission by the owner negotiating the
contract himself."
In Lane v.Albrigt, 49 Ind. 275. 278,
279, the owner proposed to the real estate
agent by letter, that if the latter would
find a purchaser for his lands-the terms
of the sale being given-the owner would
pay him $200, "if you (agent) let me
(owner) know soon." This letter was
dated :Feb. 27th 1873. The agent advertised and talked with severol parties
about the land, but the owner sold the
land himself, March 21st, the same year,
less than one month after his contract.
The agent was permitted to recover.
The court said: "The appellant (agent)
performed all that he was required to
do by the contract, and was prevented
by the appellee (owner) from selling the
land. The appellee disabled himself
from carrying out the contract of sale
made by appellant. The fact that the
appellee had authorized the appellant to
sell his land did not deprive himself of
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the power of selling it, but he could not
thereby avoid the liability to appellant."
It also appears from the report of the case
that the owner sold the land at a reduced
price " to avoid the payment to the agent
of the sum agreed upon."
An agent cannot demand commissions
on a sale not accomplished by him within

the time limited by the contract, especially where the sale is consummated,
after the expiration of the time limited,
through the interposition of a third party,
and with new incidents : .Beauchanip v.
Higgins, (Mo.) 3 Wes. Rep. 200.
EUGENE MCQULLns.

St. Louis, Mo.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
LANG v. STRAUS.
A certificate of deposit contains, by implication of law, a promise to repay the
depositor his money, and is a written contract for the payment of money.
The law is a factor in all contracts, and what the law implies is as much a part
of the contract as the words written therein.
Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the legal obligation of a contract implied
from the language employed by the parties.
ELLIOTT,

J.-The instrument declared on is a contract.

It is a

-written contract. It cannot be contradicted or varied by parol evidence. The law enters into it as a silent factor, and the obligation
implied by law from the language employed is as much part of the
contract as though what the law implies had been fully expressed
in words. Where there is an express contract, there can be no
implied one. An express written contract contains the only competent evidence of the agreement of the parties. There is here an
express written contract, and therefore there is no implied one.
But this written contract is to be given legal effect, and to give it
effect the courts must consider it as embodying all the legal obligations implied from its language. These obligations, we repeat, are
part of the written contract. The law import.ed into the contract
does not create an independent agreement, but makes the instrument
express the full agreement of the parties. All the words found in
a contract are to have a meaning attributed to them, and are not to
be thrust aside. We cannot, therefore, disregard the words, found
in the contract before us, "on deposit, in national currency." We
know that the words "national currency" denote money, and we
know, therefore, that those words, taken in connection with the words
"on deposit," mean that the appellees had received a deposit in
money from the appellant's testator: Phelps v. Town, 14 Mich. 373.
We know, also, that the law, as a factor, is an essential part of the
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contract, and it seems very plain to us that the express agreement
of the parties, considered in conjunction with this factor, imports a
contract to repay the deposit on demand. Suppose the appellees to
have attempted to show by parol that they were not to repay this
money, would not the attempt be defeated by the proposition that
such a contract cannot be varied by parol evidence ? Of this there
can be no doubt: Tisloe v. Graeter,1 Blackf. 353 ; Hull v. Butler,
7 Ind. 267 ; Jones v. Clark, 9 Id. 341 ; _Pribble v. Kent, 10 Id.
325, vide p. 328 ; Hen y v. Henry, 11 Id. 236 ; .Xlefernan v.
Mayhew, 21 Id. 291 ; Foulks v. FYalls, 91 Id. 315.
All contracts have imported into them legal principles, which can
no more be varied by parol evidence than the strongest and clearest
express stipulations. We have already given one example, that of
the days of grace added by force of law to a promissory note. A
more striking example, perhaps, is that supplied by the contract of
endorsement, for, in such cases, although not a word more than the
name of the endorser is written, the contract which the law implies
cannot be varied by parol. The authorities all agree that the regular
endorsement of a promissory note is as perfect a contract as though
the liability which the law implies were written out in full: Smythe
v. Scott, 6 N. E. Rep. 145 (November term). In contracts under
seal, as deeds, leases, and the like, covenants are ingrafted into the
agreement of the parties by operation of law; and, indeed, into
every conceivable contract the law enters as an essential element.
Into the contract before us the law enters, and makes it an agreement to repay the money received on deposit. As the contract is a
written one, not subject to variation by parol evidence, the agreement to repay the money must exist in it, or not exist at all, and
surely no just man would assert that one who receives money on
deposit, and so states in a written contract, does not undertake to
repay it. If he undertakes at all, he does so by his written contract, for there is and thdre can be no other contract, as all oral
negotiations and stipulations are merged in the writing. That, and
that alone, expresses the agreement of the parties. Oiler v. Gard,
Bd. v. Pearce, 28 Id. 502, vide p.
B
23 Ind. 212; Cincinnati,
506. The law implies a promise to pay the depositor his money,
and where there is a written contract the law conducts this implied
promise into the contract as one of its elements, so that the entire
contract is a written one. Where there is an effective written contract, there can be no verbal one: Board of Com'rs v. Shipley, 77
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Ind. 553; Pulse v. Miller, 81 Id. 191. As there is here a written
contract into which the law imports a promise to pay, the statute of
limitations governing written contracts to pay money is the only one
that applies. We thus find that, reasoning on elementary principles,
the conclusion must be that the contract is a written one for the
payment of money.
Our conclusion reaches further than that there is an implied promise to pay the depositor his money, for it goes to the extent of
affirming that this promise is created by law as an element of the
contract, and as such enters into and forms part of the written
agreement. We do not regard the promise as an independent one,
existing outside of the written contract, but as a promise forming
one of the terms of the contract. In short, we look upon it as a
part of the contract, put there by law, for the parties are presumed
to have contracted with reference to the law. The principle on which
we proceed is thus stated by Mr. Bishop: "What is implied in an
express contract is as much part of it as what is expressed." Bish.
Cont., § 121. On this subject the Supreme Court of the United
States said:- "Undoubtedly, necessary implication is as much part
of an instrument as if that which was so implied was plainly
expressed." Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 8 Wall.
276, vide p. 288.
We maintained in our former opinion, as we maintain here, that the
law implies a promise to pay back to the depositor his money, and
that, where there is a written contract stipulating that money has
been received on deposit, that promise is an essential part of the
written contract itself. It is a promise in the written instrument,
and not outside of it. "The acknowledgment of indebtedness on
its face implies a promise to pay the plaintiff," said the court, in
.Kimball v. Huntingdon, 10 Wend. 675. So we say here, an
acknowledgment that the money was received on deposit implies a
promise to pay it to th6 depositor, and we hold, as was held in the
case cited, that this promise is implied by law as an obligation arising from the language of the contract, thus forming one of its terms.
As there is an express contract, and as the promise forms part of
the contract, it is a contract for the payment of money, or else it is
no contract at all. Once it is granted that the promise to pay back
the depositor his money is created by law, then it follows, with absolute logical certainty, that the promise is as much part of the written
instrument as though it were written therein in express words.
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The authorities which bear most directly upon the question lead
to the conclusion at which we have arrived. We find an able court
saying: "Money on deposit means, ez vi termini,money placed
where the owner can command it at any time." Curtis v. Leavitt,
15 N. Y. 9, vide p. 265. In giving effect to an instrument similar
in all material respects to the one before us, that court, in a very
recent case, said :
"Being a deposit, a demand of the money was essential to a cause
of action, unless there was a wrongful conversion or loss by some
gross negligence on the part of the depositary. The distinction
between a deposit and a loan is considered in Payne v. Gardiner,
29 N. Y. 146, and within the rule there laid down the instrument
in question was a certificate of deposit." Smiley v. Try, 100 N.
Y. 262; s. c. 3 N. E. Rep. 186.
We referred to Smiley v. Try as declaring such an instrument to
be in the nature of a certificate of deposit,-and in this we are, as
the quotation we have made shows, sustained by the latest expression upon the question. At another place in the opinion from
which we have quoted, it is said : "As the instrument.in question
was not a promissory note, but a certificate of deposit, the defence
of the statute of limitations interposed by the defendant was not
available." It is perhaps true that the decision in Hotchkiss v.
Mosher, 48 N. Y. 478, is in conflict with the views we have
expressed ; for it holds, as we understand it, that a certificate of
deposit may be contradicted by parol evidence. As the court says :
"We are of the opinion that parol evidence was admissible to
explain the certificate in the same manner as in the case of a
receipt." This ruling is in conflict with our own cases, and with
the cases in New York and elsewhere, and cannot be accepted as
the law. The case is not a well-considered one, for no authorities
are cited in support of the conclusion announced. It is held by
many courts, including our own, that an order for property, accompinied by a direction to charge its value to an owner, is a written
contract containing, the promise to pay its value : Garmire v. State,
104 Ind. 444; s. c. 4 N. E. Rep. 54; United States v. Book, 2
Cranch, 0. 0. 294 ; United States v. Brown, 3 Id. 268 ; State v.
Horgan, 35 La. Ann. 293; State v. Ferguson, Id. 1042; Anderson v. State, 65 Ala. 553 ; Burke v. State, 66 Ga. 157 ; Peete v.
State, 2 Lea 513; State v. Keeter, 80 N. 0. 472 ; People v. Shaw,
5 Johns. 236 ; Com. v. Fisher, 17 Mass. 46. The principle which
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those cases declare is the same as that here involved, for the principle on which they proceed is that the law imports into the order
a promise to pay; and that is true of such an instrument as the one
now before us.
In the case of White v. -'resident, etc., 22 Pick. 181, the instrument reads thus:
"Dr. -FranklinBank in account with B. -F. White. Cr.
"February 10, 1837. To cash deposited, $2000.
"The above deposit to remain until the tenth day of August.
"B. F. BUNNELT,
Cashier."
-and this was held to be a promise to pay money at a future day.
In our original opinion we said that the instrument signed by the
appellees may not be "just what is known in the commercial world
as a certificate of deposit, but it is nevertheless a contract in
writing, evidencing the receipt of money on deposit, to which all
the legal incidents attach. It is by no means certain whether it is
not a regular certificate of deposit. It is said by a late author, in
speaking of certificates of deposit, that "usually they embody an
express promise in terms to pay; but, even if they do not, they are
yet the bank's acknowledgment of its indebtedness, and so are
nearly of the same effect as if they expressly promised payment.
Substantially, therefore, they resemble promissory notes, and the
courts have always inclined to regard them as promissory notes ;
especially when they are made payable otherwise than immediately
and upon demand. But'this is not a necessary feature. If they
are payable at a future day certain, they are simply promissory
notes, neither more nor less." Morse, Banking 63.
Our cases, in accordance with the very great weight of authority,
hold that a certificate of deposit, written in full and regular form,
is a promissory note, and as such negotiable: Gregg v. Union Co.
Bank, 87 Ind. 238; Brown v. Me Elroy, 52 Id. 404; National,
etc., Bank v. Bingel, 51 Id. 393; .Drake v. Markle, 21 Id. 433.
If the instrument we have under consideration had been written
out in full, although payable on demand, it would be a promissory
note, and it seems, under the principles we have stated, that it is a
promissory note, and as such negotiable, for it is well settled that
no precise form of words is necessary to constitute a promissory
note, as any form that expresses a promise, although not in direct
terms, will be sufficient. Thus a written statement that a designated sum is due a person named, or a certificate that a specified
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sum is due a person designated, or a mere general statement
that a certain amount is due, is considered a promissory note, and
yet in none of these instances is there an express promise to pay:
Russell v. Whipple, 2 Cow. 536 ; Franklin v. March, 6 N. H.
364; Jaques v. Warren, 31 Mo. 28; Cummings v. Freeman, 2
Humph. 145; Bell v. Brewer, 6 Ga. 587, vide p. 589; Russey v.
Winslow, 59 Me. 170; Knight v,Connecticut, etc., Co., 44 Wis.
472; Fleming v. Burge, 6 Ala. 373; Dreher v. Schreiber, 15 Mo.
602 ; Marriganv. Page, 23 Tenn. 245.
There are two well-considered cases applying the principle declared in these cases to certificates similar, in all essential respects,
to the one here declared on : Lynch v. Goldsmith, 64 Ga. 42;
Hart v. Life Ass'n, 54 Ala. 495. In the case last cited the instrument read thus :
"This certifies that the Life Association of the South has on
deposit with me the sum of 61723.45, in currency.
H. C. HART,
"President and Treasurer Local Board of Trustees."
Whether the instrument declared on is or is not negotiable is not
here an important question, and we need not and do not decide it,
for all that the record requires us to decide is that it is a contract,
a written contract, and a contract for the payment of money. The
character of the instrument, as to negotiability, does not affect the
question before us; for, as Mr. Morse says, "a certificate of deposit may or may not be made negotiable." Morse, Banking 65.
The authorities we have cited sustain our decision, and it rests
on the elementary principle we have expressed in language borrowed
from Mr. Bishop. Indeed, we do no more than apply to the contract before us the rule declared in Foulks v. Falls, supra, where
it was said:
" This agreement being implied by the law as a part of the
writer's contract, the averment of it in the complaint, or the proof
of it by oral testimony, added nothing to the contract, or to the
responsibility of the appellants." 3 Pars. Cont. 54, 515. Reilly
v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435; Weeks, Attys. § 259; Walpole v.
Carlisle, 32 Ind. 415; Skillen v. Wallace, 36 Id. 319; Rille qas
v. Bender, 78 Id. 225; Palmouth v. Shawhan, 5 N. E. R. 410.
If the appellees had inserted the words in this contract, "we
promise to pay back the depositor his money," it would not have
added to the legal force and effect of their contract, for what the
law implies is in it as it is written.
Petition overruled.

